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Abstract
In the last fifteen years foreign banks have expanded their presence significantly in almost 
all developing economies. The transition countries are among those economies that have 
experienced one of the highest levels of banking internationalization in the world. The 
foreign controlled banking asset in these countries ranges from 70 per cent in Poland to 
DOPRVWSHUFHQWLQ6ORYDNLD:LWKRXUVWXG\XVLQJSDQHOGDWDZHH[DPLQHWKHHFRQRPLF
determinants of foreign bank engagement in the four local banking markets in Central 
Europe during the period 1994-2004. In addition, we study whether the economic 
determinants affect different entry vehicles of foreign banks into the Central European 
markets. Our results show that the most important factors determining foreign bank 
engagements were (i) large potential of the Central European banking markets and low 
degree of their financial sophistication (ii) the legal origin of the home country, (iii) the 
size of the economic growth rates differentials between host and home markets, and 
(iv) finally the distance between the host country and the foreign bank headquarter. We 
also find that most foreign banks investments occurred in the period of poor creditor 
rights protection. Moreover, our results present that the economic determinants had an 
impact on the decision of the organization form of the foreign banks entering the Central 
European banking markets. Our results are robust to several controls, including the lack of 
independence of investment decisions.
Keywords: international banking, foreign direct investment, foreign bank, vehicle of 
foreign bank entry, Central Europe
JEL-Classification: G21; F21Introduction




In the last fifteen years there has been a rapid increase in the activity of foreign banks in 
several developing economies. Although, foreign bank entry occurred in many developing 
countries, its pattern was not uniform (IMF, 2000). In Latin America as well as in the Central 
European (CE) countries, the share of foreign banks in the first half of the 1990s was well 
below 20 per cent and a decade later the foreign banks controlled almost 75 per cent of 
total banking assets. By contrast, in East Asia over the same period, the average share rose 
only from 3 to 7 per cent (Barth, 2001). The level of development of a country seems also 
not to be an obvious determinant explaining foreign bank entries. In such countries as 
Egypt or Bangladesh, the foreign banks hold less than 10 per cent of banking assets. On the 
other hand in Cambodia, the Czech Republic or Turkey more than 60 per cent of domestic 
total bank assets are in the foreign hands. The differences are also meaningful among the 
transition countries. In Azerbaijan or Uzbekistan, the share of foreign banks is less than 
5 per cent, whereas in such countries as Hungary or Lithuania it amounts to almost 100 
per cent. The discrepancies are also visible in the industrial countries. In Germany or the 
8QLWHG6WDWHVWKHIRUHLJQFRQWUROOHGEDQNVKROGOHVVWKDQSHUFHQWRIDVVHWVZKHUHDVLQ
Luxemburg or New Zealand they hold more than 90 per cent.
A good financial system has been shown to be an essential ingredient for sustainable 
economic growth (Levine, 2005; World Bank, 2001). The literature on foreign banking has 
also shown that foreign bank participation can help develop a more efficient and robust 
financial system (Claessens et al., 2001). Most evidences show that increased foreign 
banking is generally positively correlated with the improvement of the efficiency of the 
domestic banking sectors and helps strengthen countries’ financial systems. Especially, 
studies on the developing countries have shown that these countries have benefited from 
this trend at most.1 Therefore, from the policy perspectives it is important to know what 
determines a favorable environment that encourages cross-border activity and entering 
foreign banks. Despite the recent trends in the banking internationalization, 28 per cent 
of developing countries still have foreign bank participation below 10 per cent and 60 per 
cent of developing countries have below 50 per cent. Among these developing countries 
with the foreign bank assets below 10 per cent, the transition countries constitute almost 
20 per cent and 25 per cent of the sample with the foreign bank participation below 50 
per cent (Van Horen, 2006; EBRD, 2005). As the experience of some Central and Eastern 
European transition countries has shown the foreign bank participation has turned out to 
be inevitable to build stable and efficient financial system. Hence, we would expect that 
in other developing and transition countries, the engagement of foreign banks might also 
turn out to be necessary in the near future.
At the same time, by permitting foreign banks to enter, the policy makers should take 
care about how the foreign banks operate in the host markets. First, letting the foreign 
banks come in, the host countries may open themselves up to economic fluctuations in the 
entrants’ home countries. Moreover, the organizational form may affect the competitive 
structure of the local banking systems, threatening profits and market share of domestic 
banks and affecting the price and quality of banking services in the host country. And 
finally, the entry through de novo operation involves different levels of parent bank 
responsibility and financial support. This can have implications not only for parent bank 
1 6HH&ODUNHet al. (2003) for review of the literature on the impact of foreign bank participation.Introduction
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but also for local regulators, who care about the stability of the host country, and for local 
depositors who care about the safety of the savings. The recent experience of Argentina, 
where some foreign banks decided not to recapitalize their foreign subsidiaries presents 
the best example on this.
On the other hand, the literature on international banking comes up with some 
arguments in favor of one entry mode versus another. While the empirical studies show 
that the entry of foreign banks through cross-border mergers and acquisitions is positively 
correlated with the efficiency improvements of the acquired banks, the entry of foreign 
banks through subsidiaries may promote greater access to the financial services in the host 
countries, as in many countries, the foreign subsidiaries have powers identical to those of 
domestic banks. Hence, although, the trade-off between one entry mode versus another is 
by local regulators required, from the policy perspectives, it is also important to know what 
determines a foreign bank’s choice of organizational form.
Today, the banking sectors of most transition countries are among the ones with the 
highest share of foreign controlled banking asset in the world. It ranges from 70 per cent 
LQ3RODQGWRDOPRVWSHUFHQWLQ6ORYDNLD$OOHQet al., 2006). The change in the share 
of foreign participation in banking in these countries from the early transition years to the 
later ones is significant.
The pattern of the banking internationalization was also not uniform in these 
countries. At the beginning of the transformation, foreign banks entered the region 
mainly new chartered operations. Encouraged by the fast going economical and political 
reforms in the region and high economic growth, the pressure to enter the CE region has 
increased. With the intention of gaining rapidly share in the local market most foreign 
banks used acquisition as an entry vehicle instead of establishing a subsidiary or branch 
in those countries.
Generally, banks are found to be attracted to markets abroad to exploit favorable 
financial system environment and to take advantage of economic opportunities in those 
FRXQWULHV*ROGEHUJDQG6DXQGHUV,QWKLVSDSHUZHWU\WRDQDO\]HDQGHVWDEOLVK
the determinants of foreign banks engagement despite the political and economical 
XQFHUWDLQWLHVLQWKHIRXU&(FRXQWULHV3RODQG&]HFK5HSXEOLF6ORYDNLDDQG+XQJDU\8VLQJ
a new sample of countries this paper tries to fill the gap by presenting the determinants of 
foreign bank engagement in the transition economies.
Our decision on the choice of this sample has been driven by some variations 
between these countries. On the one hand, these countries have experienced the most 
significant pattern of banking internationalization among the transition countries in the 
region. At the same time they represented various policies toward foreign bank entries as 
well as started their transition processes with similar initial conditions. For this reason, in 
our opinion, these countries constitute a good testing ground on determinants of foreign 
banking participation and entry vehicles chosen by foreign banks.
The literature comes up with various motives for foreign banks to go abroad. In 
addition, the mode of entry or the organizational form chosen by foreign banks is not only 
an issue of their strategy or mission, but also depends on the entry country’s conditions and 
environment. Despite the profound changes in the banking sectors of the CE economies 
as well as growing number of countries embracing foreign bank investments, there is 
still open debate about the determinants of banking internationalization and its modes 
RIHQWULHV7KHHPSLULFDOHYLGHQFHVSUHVHQWHGLQWKHOLWHUDWXUHFRPHPRVWO\IURPWKH86
and developed European countries. There has been little empirical research in this field for 
the developing countries so far. With our study we present the empirical evidence on the 
foreign bank entry determinates and chosen vehicles by them in the CE markets.
Our contribution with respect to previous literature is twofold. First, we consider 
a new set of explanatory variables than previous studies, verifying different hypothesis Introduction
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and relative importance of economic factors in determining banks’ choice of whether and 
ZKHUHWRH[SDQGDEURDG6HFRQGZHXVHIRUWKHILUVWWLPHDVDPSOHRIHQWU\PRGHOVRI
foreign banks entering the CE region. Our framework permits us to examine the relation 
between the relative importance of the different country’s factors and the chosen entry 
model by foreign banks in the CE region.
Our major finding is that the most important factors determining foreign bank 
engagement into CE countries was the depth of the financial system as well the legal 
origin of the home country. Our results also shows that the size of the economic growth 
rates differentials between host and home markets, and finally the distance between the 
host country and the banking headquarters were of great economic importance. We also 
show that determinants of bank internationalization have changed within development 
of the financial systems. Finally, our findings present that the economic determinants had 
also an impact on the decision of organization form of the foreign banks in the CE local 
banking markets.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present 
a short overview of problems encountered by the transition from planned economy to the 
market economy in the four CE countries. The third section presents the literature review 
about determinants related to our main hypothesis of the banks’ expansion abroad. At 
the end of this section we present also the results of the few empirical papers on foreign 
banking in the transition countries. In the next section, we present the variables based 
on previous empirical research, which we have applied in our regressions. In a subsection 
we develop also our main hypothesis related to the economic determinants and the 
decision about the entry mode of the foreign banks into the CE local banking markets. In 
the fifth section we present the model which investigates the incentives of foreign banks 
for entering CE countries in the last decade, the period of enormous uncertainties and 
economic transformation. The next section describes the results and compares them with 
other ones from developed countries. Finally, the last section of the paper concludes.Banking sector in early transition process
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Banking sector in early transition process
All the CE countries in our study followed the socialist financial system model, which was 
designed to support the central planning economic system. Despite the centralization of 
financial functions the state directed credit allocation with scant regard for repayment 
capacity, using the national bank and state-owned banks to channel funds to state-
owned enterprises.
As a consequence of political changes in the year 1989 the creation of an effective 
financial system was a priority for the new governments in the CE countries. The aim was 
to implement a market-oriented economy and thus fundamental changes were needed in 
WKHILQDQFLDOV\VWHP6RWKHEDQNLQJLQGXVWU\ZDVRQHRIWKHILUVWHFRQRPLFVHFWRUVZKLFK
underwent a fundamental transformation.
Hungary was the leader among the CE countries in the banking reforms. The 
government began the banking reforms even before the political changes. In the early 1980s 
the Hungarian government permitted a number of foreign banks to set up operations, even 
though these banks competed with state-owned banks in the areas of foreign exchange 
and trade-related transactions. The centralized mono-banking system was replaced by 
a two-tier banking system as the National Bank of Hungary assumed the role of a central 
bank in 1987. The new central bank was charged with pursuing monetary policy, including 
exchange rate policy, and was made responsible for the supervision of the banking sector. 
The second tier consisted of the specialty banks, newly created commercial banks, and the 
few already operating foreign banks (Hasan and Marton, 2003).
In Poland the reform of the banking system started in 1987, when the government 
allowed for creation of the joint-stock banks, yet they were still owned by the state. Two 
years later a new banking law was introduced, which created a two-tier banking system 
in Poland.
In all the CE countries as a process of creating a two-tier banking system the 
commercial and retail operation was divested from the activity of national banks and 
transferred to new commercial banks. In Hungary the government set up three new state-
owned banks from the National Bank of Hungary, in Poland nine banks were created out 
RIWKH1DWLRQDO%DQNRI3RODQGZKLOHLQ&]HFKRVORYDNLDWKURXJKGLYHVWPHQWIRUPWKH6WDWH
Bank of Czechoslovakia four banks were established. These medium sized state-owned 
banks inherited segments of the old network and staff of the national banks, household 
deposits and loan portfolio comprising mainly of credits granted to the state enterprises 
of unknown quality. They supplemented the already existing large state-owned specialty 
banks. Those specialty banks existed separately from the central bank and performed 
specific functions on behalf of the government in the planned economies. A state 
savings bank with an extensive branch network was responsible for collecting household 
deposits, although most savings was forced and done by the state. A foreign trade bank 
handled all transactions involving foreign currency. An agricultural bank provided short-
term financing to the agricultural sector. A construction bank funded long-term capital 
projects and infrastructure development (Bonin and Wachtel, 2003).2 Table 1 presents the 
representatives of each specialization group in a particular country.
2 Besides these banks there existed also some other state banks rendering other services as loans for 
example to households for development of small enterprises as in Hungary Konzumbank. Their role 
however, was very limited and government support diminished as budgets tightened. Banking sector in early transition process
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Table 1
Structure of the banking system in post-socialist economies at the beginning of 
transformation in 1989
Hungary Poland Czechoslovakia
Ratio of all specialized banks’ assets to total assets*,** 47.7% 79.1% 32.2%
Ratio of commercial banks’ assets to total assets*,** 35% 8.5% 67.8%
Ratio of total savings bank deposits to total deposits*  N/A 12.1% 52.3%
Savings Bank’s households deposits as ratio of total 
household deposits*
81.3% 70.5% 100%
Ratio of Savings Bank loans to deposits* 100% 61.3% 16.8%
6RXUFH7KRUQH
* Estimated at the date of the break-up of the mono-bank. Because in Hungary the central bank held a portion of the banking 




Although three to nine new state-owned banks were set up through the divestment 
from central banks, yet the banking industry remained fragmented as the three to four 
specialist banks still dominated the emerging banking system. However, already in the 
first year of the transformation, new banks started to operate in transition countries. The 
entry requirements policy of the newly central banks and the licensing procedure for new 
established banks was very lenient at that time. The principal motivation was to increase 
the competition of the four large banks, which were considered too inertial and ineffective. 
The number of new established banks was very impressive at this time. In Hungary six new 
banks began its operation, in Poland 40 new banks and 13 new banks in Czechoslovakia 
in 1990. Of these, three were foreign-owned in Hungary, five in Poland and four in 
Czechoslovakia.
However, this huge expansion of new domestic private banks later caused serious 
problems for the financial system. Most of those domestic banks were in general 
undercapitalized and placed an additional unwanted burden on an underdeveloped 
regulatory structure. In addition, some of them have been set up either by state enterprises 
or by local governments in order to provide soft lending to them. Hence, the features of 
banking system at the beginning of transformation were structural segmentation, high 
concentration of the assets caused by few large and medium sized state-owned banks, and 
an increasing number of small domestic private banks (Bonin et al., 2005).
Given the poor banking supervisory environment caused by poor accounting and 
financial information, weak off-side surveillance capacity and the lack of experience 
with on-site examinations, it was bound to lead to problems in the banking industry. 
The benevolent licensing policy, combined with inexperienced and still weak banking 
supervision, caused the new private domestic banks to take on rather unsound 
development strategies. In addition, the absence of effective legal and institutional 
supervision also invited fraudulent behavior by the managements of these banks. As 
a consequence the new domestic banks started to have liquidity problem in very short 
term. Also the former specialist banks get into trouble as they inherited a loan portfolio 
from the past in which credit was granted not on commercial terms. In addition, those 
banks were still the primary lending vehicle and quasi fiscal financing, usually for loss-
making state-owned enterprises that had to be either privatized or closed. The number 
of non-performing loans increased significantly as the structural problems of the real 
economy increased caused by the ongoing transition process in CE countries (Bonin and 
Wachtel, 2003). Once the compliance of supervision provision requirement was enforced, 
the quality of loan portfolios became apparent. As a consequence several large state-
owned banks reported huge losses and the equity adequacy ratios were below the 
requirement of the banking supervision.Banking sector in early transition process
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In Hungary, at the end of 1992, between 15 to 28 per cent of the credits extended 
were nonperforming loans. Those loans were primarily granted to the state-owned 
enterprises during the pre-1989 era (Hasan and Marton, 2003). The situation quickly 
became unsustainable as failing financial institutions turned for bailout to the National 
Bank of Hungary. As a result the newly established national bank was in jeopardy and 
the Hungarian government had to step in through a series of costly loan consolidation 
programs beginning in 1992 (Várhegyi, 1994,1995; Balassa, 1996). The government 
objective of the bailout programs was the cleaning-up of the books of the state-owned 
banks, which would permit a sell off to foreign strategic investors. The cost of the program 
approached close to 10 per cent of Hungary’s GDP.
Poland was the most successful in dealing with the bad debt crisis. The success is 
attributable to the design of the recapitalization program, which provided the least incentive 
for moral hazard. In addition, the central bank encouraged the buyout of troubled banks 
by foreign strategic investors. As a consequence, the costs of bad debt bank crisis were 
below 1.5 per cent of GDP and were the lowest among the transition economies.
In the Czechoslovakia the Consolidation Bank was established as a vehicle for the 
takeover of the accumulated bad loans till 1991. The bank was created to take nonperforming 
loans from the balance sheets of the largest state-owned banks and the clean-up of the 
books of other banks in the periods both before and after the division of Czechoslovakia 
'ÕGHN7KHRYHUDOOFRVWVRIWKH&RQVROLGDWLRQ%DQNDUHHVWLPDWHGWRKDYHUHDFKHG
more than 7 per cent of GDP. Nevertheless the creation of the Consolidation Bank did not 
solve the problem of the banking sector and the Czech National Bank had to intervene in 
the affairs of eight banks by 1996. In 1997 classified credits reached already 32 per cent 
RIWKHWRWDOEDQNLQJFUHGLWVLQWKH&]HFK5HSXEOLF'ÕGHN)LQDOO\WKHSUREOHPZDV
resolved through a postponed privatization of the largest banks. However, the estimates 
indicate that the final cost of bank bailout in the Czech Republic may have approached 30 
per cent of GDP as compared to just 1.5 per cent in Poland or 10 per cent in Hungary.
The growing problem of bad debt was the trigger for the postponed bank 
privatization in all the transition countries. In most of these countries the privatization of 
state-owned banks started in the beginning of the 1990’s, yet foreign banks were entitled 
only to minority shares whereas controlling stakes remained with the state treasury. As the 
problem of bad debt increased, the government was more likely to sell controlling shares in 
the state-owned banks to foreign investors. Furthermore the governments in the transition 
countries were encouraged by privatizations revenues as they started with the sell of state-
owned banks. Therefore often foreign bank entry was seen as a way of saving the ailing 
domestic banking sector in the transition countries.
In opposition to the three transition countries, in Hungary bank privatization policy 
from the beginning was aimed at selling controlling shares in state-owned banks to foreign 
investors. Although the privatization required prior an initial recapitalization of the banks 
so that the combination of current net worth and franchise value would attract a foreign 
investor. As a consequence the Hungarian government engaged in multiple recapitalizations 
of its domestic banks caused by the poor quality of loan portfolios. Thus, the government 
was able to attract foreign investors and thus signal credibly the end to bailouts of these 
banks (Hasan and Marton, 2003). In Hungary four of five large state-owned banks had 
been sold to foreign owners till the end of 1997. In addition the share of foreign banks was 
63 per cent of total assets at the end 2006.
The Polish experience indicates the danger in combining the resolution of bad loans 
with bank responsibility for enterprise restructuring. The main instrument used to restructure 
bad loans was debt to equity swaps. Hence, weak banks with no expertise in restructuring 
large companies ended up taking ownership stakes in their weak clients. Therefore bank 
credit was provided regularly to ailing enterprises and no meaningful enterprise restructuring 
was promoted (Gray and Holle, 1996). Poland’s program strengthened, rather than cut off Banking sector in early transition process
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the ties between weak banks and their undesirable clients and, thus, postponed painful 
restructuring of ailing enterprises (Bonin and Leven, 2001).
Poland’s government presented an inconsistent policy toward foreign banks. In 1993 
the government attracted the first strategic foreign investor for two of the nine midsized 
commercial banks, yet only minority shareholding was allowed. Thus, foreign institutions 
controlled only 2.1 per cent of Polish banking assets at the end of 1994. The National Bank 
of Poland however enabled foreign bank entry at the beginning as de novo operation and 
later through either the buyout of failing banks or their nonperforming credit portfolio. 
The persisting inefficiency of Polish banking system caused the government to change 
their attitude toward foreign investors. In 1997 foreign bank were allowed to take control 
in the initial privatization of the state-owned banks. At the same time the government 
started a year before to arrange a large bank merger of state-owned banks. In the years 
1998-1999 the three of the nine midsized commercial banks were merged with one of the 
VWDWHUHWDLOEDQNWRIRUPWKHVHFRQGODUJHVWEDQNLQ3RODQG6KRUWO\DIWHUZDUGVWKLVQHZ
formed bank was fully privatized by the state. In the last decade significant strides have 
been made and foreign strategic investors took control in some of the largest commercial 
banks. In 2004 the government sold 30 per cent of shares in the country’s largest state 
savings bank PKO BP through the stock exchange. As it was the last state-owned bank and 
therefore the government decided to retain a majority stake in it. In 2006 the government 
owned directly only one special bank and one retail bank and indirectly government in 
three other commercial banks. The share of foreign assets to total bank assets was 75 per 
cent at the end of 2006.
In the Czech Republic bank privatization took place twice. In 1992 the government 
of Czechoslovakia conducted a voucher privatization transferring the shares to individual 
investors and investment funds in exchange for vouchers. Three of the four large commercial 
banks participated in voucher privatization, yet these banks participated on both sides of 
privatization as they also sponsored the largest investment funds. As a result, Czech banks 
took ownership stakes in their voucher-privatized clients, some of which continued to be 
loss making, while the state retained a controlling ownership stake in the large banks. 
Consequently, voucher privatization in the Czech Republic strengthened the relationship 
between banks and clients and left bank governance held hostage to the legacies of the 
past. Thus, the privatization of the Czech banks was to little avail because soft lending 
practices continued. As a consequence these banks accumulated bad debts, which later 
have been transferred to the Consolidation Bank.
 In the Czech Republic the second round of privatization occurred from 1998 to 
2001, when the government sold holding in three major banks. Until than no Czech bank 
ZDVVROGWRDIRUHLJQLQYHVWRU7KRVHWKUHHEDQNVDFFRXQWHGIRUSHUFHQWRIDVVHWV6LQFH
then the proportion of foreign-owned bank assets soared to 96 per cent in 2006.
Concluding, the increasing foreign bank presence since the 1990s is one of the most 
striking developments in the banking system in the transition economies. On average, 
foreign-owned banks account for more than two thirds of total bank assets in most 
transition economies at the end of 2006. The percentage of assets in banks with a majority 
RIIRUHLJQRZQHUVKLSLQWKHVHFRXQWULHVUDQJHVIURPSHUFHQWLQ6ORYHQLDWRSHUFHQW
in Estonia. By contrast, in EU-15, only Luxemburg and Great Britain had more than 50 
per cent of its banking sector controlled by foreign investors in 2005 (Allen et al., 2006). 
Thus, banking sectors in transition countries differs significantly from their counterparts in 
developing as well as from emerging market countries by the unusual high percentage of 
assets held by foreign banks.Literature review




In the last decades various studies have been conducted that investigated the motivation 
and location choice of banks abroad.3
The classical hypothesis (Aliber, 1984) is that banks follow their customers abroad 
being afraid of losing them once they have established relationships with banks operating 
in other countries. According to the defensive expansion hypothesis, banks’ expansion 
enables them to retain information on their customers.
Multinational banking hypotheses relating to the servicing and following their clients 








investment made by foreign firms into the market was a significant positive determinant of 
JURZWKRIIRUHLJQEDQNVĳPDUNHWVKDUHLQWKH86+XOWPDQDQG0F*HHDQG*URVVH
DQG*ROGEHUJDOVRSURYLGHGUHVXOWVWKDWIRUHLJQEDQNVHQWHUHGWKH86PDUNHWWR
service the international trade and direct investment needs of their home-country clients. 
In a recent study similar results were presented by Magri et al. (2005) in a study on entry 
decisions and activity levels of foreign banks operating in Italy. The authors report that 
trade influences both entry decision and activity levels of foreign banks. However, they 
found also that the relative profitability of banking activity in Italy strongly influences both 
entry decisions and activity levels. As a consequence the observed correlation in several 
studies between proxies for foreign investment trade and the structure of a foreign market 
complicates the conclusions on motivation. Thus, the motivation of bank to move abroad 
may be explained by the need to follow its clients and equally by the lure of a potentially 
significant new market.
The importance of new market opportunities in attracting foreign banks has been 
emphasized by the eclectic theory of direct investment (Dunning, 1977). The theory 
was extended by Gray and Gray (1981) to explain multinational banking. In this theory 
internationalization of banks is contingent upon location-specific factors and ownership-
specific factors.
The location-specific factors are the size and competition in the foreign market, 
presence of entry restriction and other regulations. Foreign market size has been found to 
be a significant driver of multinational banking by Terrell (1979) and Goldberg and Grosse 
(1994). While, Goldberg and Johnson (1990) provides some support for relative lack of 
competition or high relative profitability as causal factors. In contrast Nigh et al. (1986) 
did not found that local market opportunity to have a significant effect. In their study they 
DQDO\]HGWKHUROHRIORFDWLRQVSHFLILFIDFWRUVLQIRUHLJQLQYROYHPHQWRIWKH86EDQNV
Recent studies presented a new approach to multinational banking and market 
structures. In those studies banks may use economic crises and distortions in the banking 
3 6HH:LOOLDPVIRUDFRPSUHKHQVLYHVXUYH\RIOLWHUDWXUHRQIRUHLJQEDQNLQYHVWPHQWVLiterature review
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industry in order to enter a foreign market. Peek and Rosengren (2000) found evidence 
that as a result of liberalizations and of the worsening conditions in domestic markets, 
foreign banks expanded in several Latin American countries. Consistent with this result, 
*XLOOHĢQDQG7VFKRHJOIRXQGWKDW6SDQLVKEDQNVKDYHLQFUHDVHGWKHLURZQHUVKLS
in Argentina’s banks during the economic crisis of the last decade. However, Engwall et 
alIRXQGWKDWIRUHLJQEDQNVORVWPDUNHWVKDUHLQ6ZHGHQGXULQJWKH6FDQGLQDYLDQ
banking crisis in the early 1990s. On the other hand, at the same time they found that 
foreign banks increased their market share in Norway. As we can see, the empirical results 
do not present a clear picture on market structure, yet it seems that foreign banks may use 
a domestic crisis in order to increase their market share in the market.
The ownership specific factors emphasize that banks become multinational in order to 
employ their domestic strengths in foreign markets at low marginal cost and thus leverage 
WKRVHVWUHQJWKV6XFKDGYDQWDJHVFDQWDNHPDQ\IRUPVLQFOXGLQJODUJHVFDOHRIRSHUDWLRQ
low cost of capital, unique business processes or banking technology, skilled personnel and 
banks’ reputation (Nigh et al., 1986; Tschoegl, 1987). Among bank specific characteristics, 
size has been found to affect mainly the patterns of foreign direct investment. Ball and 
Tschoegl (1982) provided evidence that the larger banks are much more international than 
smaller ones.
Consistent with this result Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001) have shown that banks with 
foreign shareholdings are on average larger and have headquarters in countries with a more 
developed and efficient banking market. However, Berger et al. (1995) argue that larger 
banks have generally larger and more internationally diversified customers, and therefore 
these banks have more incentives to follow their clients when they operate abroad. If it is the 
case than large foreign banks would rather follow their multinational clients than have been 
encouraged by their comparative advantage. In addition, several studies have documented 
WKDWIRUHLJQRZQHGEDQNVDUHQRWDVSURILWDEOHDVWKHLUGRPHVWLFSHHUV6HWKDQG
Nolle (1995) found that foreign-owned banks were not as profitable as domestically owned 
banks, based on aggregate profits. DeYoung and Nolle (1996) use a profit-efficiency model 
and conclude that foreign-owned banks were less profit-efficient because of their reliance 
on purchased funds. Molyneux et al. (1997) applying a simultaneous equations framework 
concludes that the profitability of foreign-owned banks was mainly related to capital ratios, 
commercial and industrial loan growth and asset portfolio composition.
Although, the presence of higher demand profit opportunities in the market of 
destination of the investment seems likely to be an obvious determinant of the location 
choice of multinational banks, the empirical studies are more equivocal on location-specific 
factors and ownership-specific factors as motives for banks to go abroad.
Apart from leveraging existing advantages, following clients or seeking attractive 
markets overseas, there are other determinants of bank expansion abroad. In the opinion of 
Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001) bank internationalization depends on other factors besides the 
degree of economic integration among countries. While, Claessens et al. (2000) analyzing 
foreign presence across 80 countries from 1988 to 1995 presents that foreign banks are 
attracted to markets with low taxes and a high per capita income. He reports however 
that the regulatory restrictions significantly affect the pattern of bank investment abroad. 
0LOOHUDQG3DUNKHSUHVHQWHGWKDW86EDQNVSUHIHUWRH[SDQGLQFRXQWULHVZKHUH
capital requirements are less stringent and taxes are lower. Consistent with this result, Nigh 
et al. (1986) and Goldberg and Johnson (1990) have shown that restrictions on the entry 
of foreign investors significantly reduce the degree of internationalization of a country’s 
banking market. In Boot (1999) opinion governments desire that the largest banks in their 
countries are domestically owned. Thus, we would expect that in high concentrated markets 
as the CE, the entry of foreign banks is more difficult. In this case a single acquisition of 
the former state-owned banks would imply the loss of a significant market share to the 
advantage of foreign financial institution.Literature review
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The literature on the restructuring and development of the financial sector in 
transition economies is abundant. However, the empirical literature on banking in 
transition countries concentrates mainly on the impact of foreign bank entry on banking 
efficiency. Yildirim and Philippatos (2002) find that foreign banks in transition countries 
are more cost efficient but less profit efficient relative to domestic banks. Hasan and 
Marton (2003) and Fries and Taci (2003) demonstrate that the entry of more efficient 
foreign banks creates an environment that forces the entire banking system in transition 
countries to become more efficient, both directly and indirectly. Buch (2000) compares 
LQWHUHVWUDWHVSUHDGVLQ+XQJDU\3RODQGDQGWKH&]HFK5HSXEOLFIURPWR6KH
finds evidence confirming the hypothesis that foreign banks create a more competitive 
market environment in transition economies, but only after they have attained sufficient 
aggregate market share. The results were conformed to Zajc (2002), who reported for 
six European transition countries that foreign bank entry reduces net interest income 
and profit, and increases costs of domestic banks. While, Bonin et al. (2003) examine 
the performance of banks in eleven transition countries and show that majority foreign 
ownership is associated with improved bank efficiency.
On the contrary, Green et al. (2002) estimate the efficiency of domestic and foreign 
banks in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in terms of economies of scale and scope. 
They find that foreign banks are not really different from domestic banks and that bank 
ownership is not an important factor in reducing bank costs. There results were in opposition 
to Claessens et al. (2001), who reported that foreign banks in CEE countries tend to have 
lower overhead costs and loan loss provisions and higher profits than domestic banks.
Fries and Taci (2005) have shown that costs are lower in those transition countries 
where foreign-owned banks have a large share of assets. While, de Hass and van Lelyveld 
(2003) argued that the increase in foreign banks have contributed to credit stability in CEE 
by keeping up credit supply during crisis periods, while domestic banks reduced theirs. 
Although their results also have shown that the privatization of domestic banking systems 
in CEE as such has not led to immediate positive stability effects. They have shown that 
banks that are sold to foreign strategic investors do not change immediately into more 
efficient banks. Additionally, they presented that the country conditions matter for foreign 
bank growth, as they have reported a significant negative relationship between home 
country economic growth and host country credit by foreign bank subsidiaries. Bonin et 
al. (2005) have shown similar results in a study on the impact of bank privatization in 
transition countries. They have reported that state-owned banks are the least efficient 
and new established foreign banks are the most efficient of all bank types in transition 
countries. However, they found also that domestic banks have a local advantage against 
foreign banks in pursuing fee for service business.
The effects of foreign ownership on bank efficiency have been also examined in 
a few country specific studies. For Hungary, Hasan and Marton (2003) find that relatively 
more efficient foreign banks created an environment that forced the entire banking system 
to become more efficient in the years 1993 to 1998. Nikiel and Opiela (2002) find that 
foreign banks servicing foreigners and business customers are more cost-efficient but less 
profit-efficient than other banks in Poland from 1997 to 2000. For the Czech Republic and 
Poland, Weill (2003) reported that foreign-owned banks were significantly more efficient 
than domestically owned banks in 1997. To the contrary, Matousek and Taci (2002) observed 
greater efficiency in private banks in the Czech Republic for the period 1993-1998. Yet, they 
did not found any evidence of greater efficiency of foreign-owned banks in their study. 
Although these single country studies provide mainly a positive relation between foreign 
ownership and bank performance, yet the results are not always convincing.
Finally, Naaborg et al. (2003) presents that the three largest banks in most European 
transition economies are in foreign hands. However, banks from non-European countries 
are almost absent in the transition countries. In addition, they report that there is a relatively Literature review
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strong presence in some of the European transition economies of foreign banks from 
neighboring countries.
While the empirical evidence confirms the follower relationship hypothesis, the 
LPSRUWDQFHRIORFDOPDUNHWRSSRUWXQLWLHVUHTXLUHVGHHSHULQYHVWLJDWLRQ6RIDUOLWWOHUHVHDUFK
has been undertaken in order to examine the relation between foreign bank expansion and 
economic and structural characteristics of host countries. In particular, a variable measuring 
profit opportunities usually mentioned in the theory is either omitted in empirical studies, 
because of limited data availability, or found to be non significant.
In addition, the validity of the foreign bank motivation and entry modes has not 
been yet established for the transition countries due to the modest attention given to 
their empirical verification. Our study tries to fill the existing gap in the multinational 
banking literature building our study upon previous empirical work. We focus on this 
aspect arguing that transition countries are an interesting testing ground for theories on 
multinational banking. In 1990s, the economy and financial market were characterized 
by lack of competition and close regulation. The situation changed in the 1990s due to 
political transformation, when the financial markets were liberalized and competition in 
the market increased. As a consequence, the transition economy and thus the banking 
sector offered several profit opportunities to be exploited by foreign banks. Yet, it is still 
unclear which motives for foreign banks had been the leading in the decision to go into 
one of the transition countries.Economic determinants contributing to FDI in CE banking sector
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Economic determinants contributing to FDI in CE banking sector
As have been shown in the previous section, there are various theories explaining the 
motives for banks to invest abroad. In this section, we review the determinants that have 
been provided by the literature as the motivation of foreign banking and present the 
proxies we have included in our regressions. Our aim is to present the determinants that 
have been the leading in attracting foreign banks in the CE countries. In our study we have 
decided to organize the selected determinants into four major groups. Each of the group 
represents a different hypothesis providing an explanation on the motives behind foreign 
bank investments into one of the CE country. In addition, we hope this way to be able to 
establish the relationship between the motivation and the model of entry chosen by the 
foreign banks. We review the determinants of engagements of foreign banks in more detail 
in the sub-section below. Given the above considerations, we present the following four 
hypotheses to be tested.
Hypothesis 1: The foreign bank involvement is positively related to client’s presence 
in the CE country.
Hypothesis  2:  The foreign bank involvement is positively related to market 
opportunities in the CE country.
Hypothesis 3: The foreign bank involvement is positively related to low efficiency of 
domestic banks in the CE country.
Hypothesis 4: The foreign bank involvement is positively related to favorable 
regulations in the CE country.
As have been already mentioned in the past the pattern of foreign bank expansion 
has been dominated by the follower relationship. Under this hypothesis banks decided to 
expand in order to provide services to their home country clients in countries abroad. At 
the same time those banks operating abroad have gained a growing understanding of 
foreign markets and have increased the range of their operation and services. Thus, we 
believe that the pattern of foreign banks has some characteristics which are peculiar to 
the banking industry, yet the choice of expanding abroad depends on a wider range than 
just one single factor. Therefore our hypotheses should be seen with great caution as the 
variables presenting them may be significant simultaneously and it is difficult to assess, 
which of them may be more important on a stand alone basis.
Lag on non-financial foreign direct investment
Our first measure controls for the first hypothesis to be tested, which have been shown in 
many previous studies as an important motivation for foreign bank expansion. As a proxy 
for the follower hypothesis we use as proxy the stock of direct investments excluding 
financial industry into one of the countries in the CE from the country of origin of the 
foreign bank. The variable non-financial FDI was expressed as ratio to the domestic country 
GDP. We employ it as a lagged one measure as the rationale is that home banks will follow 
their customers abroad so that they can provide services for them in the foreign operations. 
Thus, we expected that there is a positive relationship between foreign direct investments 
and the expansion of banks abroad. A strong positive relationship has been reported in the 
studies of Nigh et al. (1986) and Goldberg and Johnson (1990). They have found a positive 
UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKH86EDQNVIRUHLJQDFWLYLWLHVDQGWKHVL]HRI86IRUHLJQGLUHFW
investments abroad.Economic determinants contributing to FDI in CE banking sector
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Liquid liabilities
Another common assumption in the empirical literature is that a well developed financial 
market may attract foreign banks due to external agglomeration economies (Davis, 1992; 
Kindleberger, 1974). The rationale behind is that investors consider whether to invest in 
foreign banking, the size and structure of the particular financial system is likely to be one 
of the factors they take into account. Thus, Konopielko (1997) formulated a hypothesis that 
with the economic development of other countries the significance of the follow the client 
rationale for foreign entry in banking will diminish and subsequently be replaced by search 
for client’s behavior, which presents our second hypothesis in our paper.
This claim was supported by Dopico and Wilcox (2002) who argued that the size 
of the host country’s banking market is one of the significant determinants of foreign 
expansion. They found that foreign banks are more pervasive in countries where banking 
is more profitable and where the banking sector is smaller relative to GDP. In order to 
control for these characteristics, we considered size of the financial sector and the banking 
sector, whereas the profit opportunities present our next hypothesis and the proxies will 
be described later. In our study the size of the domestic banking market of one of the CE 
countries is a location-specific determinant of foreign bank expansion.
We employ liquid liabilities, which are defined as the ratio of liquid liabilities of the 
financial system to GDP. We consider this variable, as it is usual in the finance literature, as 
a proxy of financial depth since it represents the size of the formal financial intermediary 
sector. The implicit assumption is that the size of the financial system is positively related 
to the foreign bank entry. Including liquid liabilities to GDP might also control for the 
effects of financial system underdevelopment that differ systematically by income levels 
across countries.
Bank deposit
In this study, similar to the study of Grosse and Goldberg (1991), the size of the banking 
market is proxied by the deposits held by the domestic banks to GDP. This variable allows us 
to see whether smaller and less developed domestic banking sectors attract more foreign 
banking. In theory the larger the domestic banking market, the greater the number of 
potential customers. This would suggest that there should be a large number of foreign 
banks willing to invest in large markets in order to take advantage of the market’s potential. 
In our study we expect a positive relation between the size of the banking market and the 
number of foreign banks. Especially in case of Poland, which is the biggest country in the 




in countries where a smaller number of domestic banks dominated banking. They argued 
that greater concentration limited the choices available to borrowers, forced domestic firms 
into relationships with the dominant banks and stunted the development of an arms-length 
lending market. In such a market, even though banking might be profitable, foreign banks 
might be unable to enter. We test for this by including a five-bank concentration ratio in 
our model specifications and expect a negative relationship with foreign banking entry.
Market capitalization and turnover ratio
Demirgüç–Kunt and Levine (1996) documented that in different countries the extent of stock 
market development highly correlates with the development of banks and other financial 
institutions. We use the value of domestic equities on domestic exchanges divided by GDP 
to measure the development of the stock market. In addition, we use the values of equities 
traded to GDP, which reflect the activity of stock markets in transition countries. The total 
value traded ratio is frequently used to gauge market liquidity because it measures market Economic determinants contributing to FDI in CE banking sector
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trading relative to economic activity. On one side, we would expect significant positive 
relationship between the development of banking sector and capital markets in transition 
countries. On the other side, the more active and developed the capital market, the greater 
the competition with the banking industry. Thus, we may also assume a negative relation 
between stock market development and activity and foreign bank entry.
Net interest margin and overhead costs
In order to test the importance of market opportunities in the transition countries we 
employ two different variables. To test whether the overall profitability of banking in the 
host country influenced foreign banking, we include a profitability measure the net interest 
margin (Claessens et al., 2001; Dopico and Wilcox, 2002). High net interest margins in the 
CEE countries in comparison to other developed countries have been observed in the past 
(Allen et al., 2006). However, Lensink and Hermes (2004) find that in developing countries, 
IRUHLJQHQWU\LVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKVKULQNLQJQHWLQWHUHVWPDUJLQV6LPLODUUHVXOWVZHUH
previously reported by Claessens et al. (2001), who demonstrated that for most countries 
higher foreign ownership is associated with a reduction of costs and net interest margins 
for domestically owned banks. Those results were confirmed recently by Allen et al. (2006) 
in a study on the EU-25 financial system. The authors have shown a gradually decline of the 
interest margins in the CEE region over the last decade and the convergence towards the 
levels reported in the developed countries.
Another source of motivation to expand abroad can be the foreign banks’ efficiency 
relative to that of the domestic banks. According to Tschoegl (1987), high overhead 
costs, low efficiency of management and the cost of capital can increase the likelihood 
of foreign bank expansion into the market. In the Czech Republic and Poland foreign-
owned banks were more efficient than domestic owned banks and this was not due to 
scale differences or the structure of activities (Weill, 2003), which would confirm our 
hypothesis. Therefore, to estimate and control for inefficient domestic banks, we include 
the measures of overhead costs.
We will use these two variables in order to test our third hypothesis that foreign 
banks expand into those markets, where are the highest profit opportunities and the 
lowest efficiency of banks. We expect that foreign banks entering the market will see an 
opportunity to export their knowledge, which will give them a competitive advantage in 
the domestic banking markets. Thus, we assume that the foreign banks are probably the 
most efficient in their home market. The combination of high profit opportunities and 
the inefficiency of the domestic banks provide the motivation for the third hypothesis 
on foreign bank expansion into the CE countries. Therefore we expected that those two 
variables will have a positive effect on the foreign entry into the region.
Legal origin, creditor rights and banking regulations
$FFRUGLQJWR*ROGEHUJDQG6DXQGHUVLQWHUQDWLRQDOH[SDQVLRQPD\EHDIIHFWHG
by both economic and regulatory factors. In a series of influential papers La Porta et al.
(1997,1998) stress that the cross-country differences in the legal environment and their 
enforcement may influence the financial structure. Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that 
bank-based financial structure prevails and is more effective in countries with weak legal 
systems and poor infrastructures. While, Darby (1986) presents that the rate of growth by 
particular parent countries may be stimulated by home country regulation that reduces 
domestic profitability. To examine this issue, we follow La Porta et al. (1997) and consider 
institutional factors that measure the quality of the legal environment both overall and 
specifically for creditors.
We used the data on the legal origin from the La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) studies 
the countries were classified into five legal origin groups. With respect to legal origin, 
La Porta et al. (1997) distinguish first between common law and civil law countries. The 
civil law comes from Roman law and relies heavily on legal scholars to formulate its rules, Economic determinants contributing to FDI in CE banking sector
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whereas the common law originates from English law and relies on judges to resolve 
GLVSXWHV,WLVFRPPRQWRIXUWKHUGLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQ)UHQFK*HUPDQDQG6FDQGLQDYLDQ
civil law countries. In addition, we separately control for the legal origin of the transition 
economies were the legal system represents currently a combination between the French 
and German civil law.
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000) argue that common law countries protect both 
shareholders and creditors the most. More specifically, La Porta et al. (1998) shows that 
countries based on the English tradition have laws that emphasize the rights of creditors 
WRDJUHDWHUGHJUHHWKDQWKH)UHQFK*HUPDQDQG6FDQGLQDYLDQFRXQWULHV)UHQFKFLYLOODZ
FRXQWULHVJLYHWKHZHDNHVWSURWHFWLRQWRFUHGLWRUVZKHUHDV*HUPDQDQG6FDQGLQDYLDQFLYLO
law countries are somewhere in between. La Porta et al. (1998) also examine enforcement 
quality. Countries with a French legal heritage have the lowest quality of law enforcement, 
ZKLOHFRXQWULHVZLWK*HUPDQDQG6FDQGLQDYLDQOHJDOWUDGLWLRQVWHQGWREHWKHEHVWDW
enforcing contracts. In our study the variable English Legal Origin equals one if the country 
KDVDQ(QJOLVKOHJDOWUDGLWLRQDQG]HURRWKHUZLVH6LPLODUO\)UHQFK/HJDO2ULJLQ*HUPDQ
/HJDO2ULJLQ6FDQGLQDYLDQ/HJDO2ULJLQDQG6RFLDOLVW/HJDO2ULJLQWDNHRQDSSURSULDWH
values of one and zero for each country.
Legal and regulatory systems that facilitate the repossession of collateral and 
that grant creditors a clear say in reorganization decisions are likely to encourage the 
development of banks. As shown by La Porta et al. (1997) greater creditor right is positively 
associated with financial institutions development. Thus, reforms improving creditor 
protection may attract foreign bank entry into the transition countries. In terms of the 
specific indicators, we follow Pistor et al. (2000) who modify the index of La Porta et al.
(1997) by excluding one and including two additional variables, referring the index to the 
problems of transition countries. In our analysis, the index ranges from zero to five and 
aggregates creditor rights.
 The creditor rights variable is described in La Porta et al. (1998) and Pistor (2004). 
We expect that those countries with the legal systems that assign strong rights to creditor 
are more likely to support the growth of banks including those of foreign origin.
Aliber (1984) and Hultman and McGee (1989) noted that a host country’s regulatory 
environment affect foreign banking. Using the Barth et al. (2001) analysis of commercial 
bank regulations, we construct an aggregate index of regulatory restrictions on bank 
activities in securities, insurance, and real estate markets and restrictions on bank ownership 
of non-financial firms. This measure of regulatory restrictions on bank activities gauges 
bank power and therefore allow us to test whether restrictions on the range of permissible 
banking activities affected foreign banking. Therefore, we anticipated a negative relation 
between foreign bank entry and regulatory restriction on bank activities.
Economic growth and inflation
:HOOHUDQG6FKHUFODLPHGWKDWWKHUHDOHFRQRPLFJURZWKDQGWKHOHYHORI
development of domestic banking determine foreign banks’ presence in the host 
countries. In order to control for economic growth we include a variable representing 
difference in economic growth between host and home country of the foreign bank. We 
expect to find a positive correlation between the difference in economic growth rate and 
the presence of foreign banks.
A series of recent papers have addressed the study of the long-run influence of 
inflation on growth and financial system development (Barro, 1995). The main findings 
of this body of empirical literature may be summarized as follows. First, inflation has 
a negative temporary impact upon long-term growth rates. This effect is significant and 
JHQHUDWHVDSHUPDQHQWUHGXFWLRQLQWKHOHYHORISHUFDSLWDLQFRPH6HFRQGLQIODWLRQ
not only reduces the level of investment but also the efficiency with which productive 
factors are used.Economic determinants contributing to FDI in CE banking sector
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Exchange rate and corporate tax rate
To consider long-term economic conditions of the countries in our study, we include two 
additional variables. The first is the change in foreign exchange rates of the currency of 
the domestic country against the euro currency. We use the exchange rate towards euro 
as most of the foreign banks stem from the euro area. We will test whether fluctuations in 
the value of the host countries’ currencies affect the level of foreign investment in banking 
in CE countries.
Operating a banks subsidiary abroad will involve substantial flow of foreign 
currencies. A depreciation of domestic currency may motivate foreigners to acquire the 
control of domestic bank. In addition, when the host countries’ currencies depreciate, 
foreign banks may reduce their repatriated income and increase their reinvestment in the 
host countries, as they may want to avoid exchange rate losses. On the other hand, when 
the host countries’ currencies appreciate with respect to foreign banks currencies, capital 
flows is expected to decrease as it becomes more expensive for foreign investors to invest 
LQRQHRIWKH&(FRXQWULHV6XFKDQHJDWLYHUHODWLRQKDVEHHQUHSRUWHGE\*ROGEHUJDQG
6DXQGHUVDQG)URRWDQG6WHLQ
Our second variable is the level of corporate tax in the CE countries. In the literature 
overseas bank expansion is also frequently attributed to the variations in tax treatment of 
banks in different countries. Thus, taxes may influence the level of foreign direct investment 
in banking in the region. The corporate tax regime in use may therefore determine whether 
or not a country is an attractive location for a foreign bank to establish a subsidiary. At 
the same time the foreign entry can be a response to moves by the host country to attract 
foreign banks by offering more favorable tax treatment than the bank’s home country or in 
order to increase competition in the financial services sector.
Geographic location
The geographic differences between the home and host nations may proxy not only the 
geographical, but also the cultural distance between countries. Given the importance of 
information about customers as well as of knowledge of outlet markets in banking, we 
expected a negative relationship between distance and foreign entry. In addition, in several 
studies the geographical distance has been applied in the literature as a proxy for the 
degree of economic integration (Ball and Tschoegl, 1982; Grosse and Goldberg, 1991).
We measure the geographic difference using the distance between banks host 
and home country. A negative relationship may indicate that the difficulty of operating 
a subsidiary in a foreign country grows as geographical and cultural differences increase. 
Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001) have reported that the distance increases the probability of 
market entry by acquiring shares in a foreign bank. While, Magri et al. (2005) presented 
that the likelihood of operating a foreign bank in Italy diminish as geographical and cultural 
differences increased.
EU membership
Finally, following Magri et al. (2005) we introduced also a dummy in the estimates to 
identify countries belonging to the EU. We assume that EU banks should have an advantage 
to other foreign banks due to lower entry barriers and extended the activities that are 
permitted to undertake under the EU Directive. Therefore we expected the variable to exert 
a positive effect, which has been reported by Magri et al. (2005) in Italy.
4.1 Economic determinants and the entry modes of foreign banks
In principle, the factors affecting the decision about entry into the CE countries may vary 
with the mode of entry chosen by a bank. High net interest margin or great economic 
development may promote one form of entry, while tax relieves or high concentration Economic determinants contributing to FDI in CE banking sector
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of the banking sector may influence positively the other formal structures. Hence, an 
organizational form is not an arbitrary formality but rather a function of foreign bank’s 
strategy and scope of its activities willing to provide in the host country. In addition, foreign 
bank must take into constitute an economic environment existing both in home and host 
countries. The legal form chosen by a foreign bank is also of great substantive importance 
from another reason. It may under certain circumstances have effect on the stability of 
both home and host banking sectors. The first one may be affected by a failure or great 
losses of a parent’s bank institution in a host country. From the point of view of a host 
country, the regulations promoting particular modes of entry may prevent country from 
a crisis or at least attenuate their effects (Tschoegl 2003).
The regulatory environment of the CE countries has changed over time. Furthermore, 
it was also different among the countries themselves. In principle, the foreign banks could 
enter the CE countries either by acquiring or merging with a domestic bank or through 
de novo operation. We distinguish among the operational forms a subsidiary or branch of 
DSDUHQWFRPSDQ\DVZHOODVDUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIILFHRIDEDQN6LQFHEDQNĳVUHSUHVHQWDWLYH
office can not provide any financial services in a host country, we do not consider them in 
our analysis.
A branch is defined as an integral part of the parent organization and in our opinion 
it constitutes the highest level of foreign banking penetration in a host country. The branch 
shares a parent’s credit rating, lends and trades on the parent’s full capital base. Thus, 
it may have substantial advantage in a host country banking market. However, a branch 
may go insolvent if its parent goes bankrupt or other way around. Thus, this mode of 
entry requires a careful supervision of both home and host country’s authorities. The Polish 
banking law allowed the foreign banks to enter via branches since 1989. The licensing 
policy was also very liberal at that time. The only requirement to be fulfilled by a foreign 
bank to set up a branch was an agreement with the National Bank of Poland. However, 
despite that, Poland did not experience in wave of branches. The situation has not changed 
significantly until now. One of the reasons was that the Polish National Bank was not willing 
to allow foreign banks to operate as branches easily.
The situation looked differently in Hungary. The Hungarian regulatory authorities 
DEROLVKHGWKHHQWU\YLDEUDQFKXQWLODQGHYHQDIWHUWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH6HFRQG
Banking Act Amendment in 1997, which provided a possibility to establish a branch by 
a foreign institution, this form effectively qualified as subsidiaries in terms of capital 
requirements and operations (Kiraly et al., 1999). Although, the operation activities via 
branches are allowed, the country has not experienced any opening of branches till 2004.
,QWKH&]HFK5HSXEOLFDQGWKH6ORYDNLDWKHVLWXDWLRQORRNHGYHU\VLPLODUWR3RODQG
The banking laws from their beginning allowed foreign banks to set up branches assumed 
they received a formal approval from the host national central bank.
6LQFHWKHDFFHVVLRQLQWRWKH(8WKHPHPEHUVWDWHVKDVEHHQJUDQWHGDĴVLQJOH
passport”, which assumes that all credit institutions authorized in an European Economic 
Area (EEA) country would be able to establish branches or supply cross-border financial 
services in the other countries of the EEA without further authorization, provided that 
a bank was authorized to provide such services in the home state (Dermine, 2005).4
Table 2 shows that branch has been very rare mode of penetrating CE banking 
markets comparing with other European countries despite any specific restrictions 
(excluding Hungary) per se imposed by the regulatory authorities on this organizational 
form. One reason for that could be that branches are very sensitive to the location-specific 
risk (Tschoegl, 2003). Hence, in the course of instable political and economic situation, the 
parent banks preferred to choose other organizational forms, which could put them in the 
4 The EEA agreement allows the three EFTA states – Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway – to participate in 
the European single market without joining the EU.Economic determinants contributing to FDI in CE banking sector
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more secured position and did not require risking their reputations once the expectations 
of great economic development would not have been met. Wengel (1995) has proved it 
empirically concluding that the parent tends to send branches to wealthier countries, while 
the less sophisticated forms to the developing ones. On the other hand, setting up a branch 
of foreign bank should be justified by sufficient activities in the area for which a branch 
offers an advantage (Heinkel and Levi, 1992). Therefore, many studies on international 
banking argue that branches are not attracted by great profit opportunities and hence they 
do not state in the direct competition with other legal forms (Miller and Parkhe, 1998). In 
WKH86+HLQNHODQG/HYLIRXQGWKDWVHWWLQJXSDEUDQFKZDVSRVLWLYHO\FRUUHODWHG
with the development of the domestic money and capital markets, in which the foreign 
branches participate allocating the deposits of their customers collected in the home 
market. Hence, we may assume that the development of the capital markets in the CE 
countries as well as better creditor rights may positively affect the inflow of branches into 
this region.
Table 2
Branches of foreign banks in the EU
Old EU Member 
States
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Belgium 40 39 44 47 46 46 48 45
D e n m a r k 789998 1 5 1 7
G e r m a n y 7 78 48 79 08 08 38 48 3
Greece 23 23 22 22 21 21 20 23
Spain 53 51 52 51 56 59 57 61
France 93 89 88 90 83 79 80 82
Ireland 18 21 26 28 32 31 31 32
Italy 81 83 88 98 110 106 91 60
L u x e m b u r g 6 86 86 86 36 35 55 04 7
Netherlands 20 21 26 28 28 28 28 14
Austria 6 9 12 13 15 15 18 18
Portugal 15 18 20 23 23 21 22 27
F i n l a n d 6675 1 8 1 9 1 8 2 0
Sweden 14 17 16 19 19 18 17 20
United Kingdom 252 242 227 221 202 190 172 172
CE countries/ New EU Member States 
P o l a n d 33321113
H u n g a r y 00000000
Czech Republic 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 9
S l o v a k i a 42222224
6RXUFHQDWLRQDOFHQWUDOEDQNVQDWLRQDODQQXDOUHSRUWVRIWKH&RPPLVVLRQVIRUWKH%DQNLQJ6XSHUYLVLRQ(&%
A subsidiary is a separate legal entity incorporated in the host country, mostly acted as 
wholly-owned subsidiary company of a parent bank and often it is engaged in a broader range 
RIILQDQFLDOVHUYLFHVWKDQEUDQFKHV6LQFHWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWUDQVIRUPDWLRQWKHVXEVLGLDULHV
were the most frequent forms of entering the CE banking markets. Heinkel and Levi (1992) 
point out that subsidiaries differ from other forms of banking operations and thus respond 
differently to various factors. First, they operate in the different area of competition than 
RWKHUOHJDOIRUPV6HFRQGWKHSDUHQWEDQNKDVGLIIHUHQWPRWLYDWLRQVRQHVWDEOLVKLQJLW,Q
the CE the history of subsidiaries can be divided into two periods. The first, early 1990s when 
the subsidiaries were set up and second, the middle of 90s when the privatization process 
began. The motivations of entry through this type of organizational form have also changed 
across time. In the early of 1990s, the major motive driving an establishment of a subsidiary 
was to provide high-quality services to these companies which had invested in or traded Economic determinants contributing to FDI in CE banking sector
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with the CE countries as well as their foreign employees on the spot (Majnoni et al. 2003). 
Thus, these subsidiaries were mostly engaged in the wholesale and corporate banking, trade 
and exchange foreign operations. The best example is Commerzbank in Hungary (1993) 
and Czech Republic (1991), while in Poland Citibank (1991) or BNP – Dresdner Bank (1994). 
It should be also mentioned that many of these banks were motivated to enter by the tax 
relieves which were very common practice at that time in CE countries. Unlike branches 
which are subject to the home country’s regulations and tax and accounting standards, this 
could be an additional motivation for setting up a subsidiary.
In the middle of 1990s, during the time of the major bank privatizations, the 
motivations behind setting up a subsidiary changed. In this period foreign banks noticed 
DQRSSRUWXQLW\RIDFTXLULQJODUJHGRPHVWLFXQLYHUVDOEDQNV6RPHRIWKHPDFTXLUHG
subsidiaries and even merged them with already existing operation or branches. Apart 
from it in this period many subsidiaries of the foreign banking institutions began to operate, 
especially in consumer finance sector as Opel Bank, Ford Bank or Fiat Bank.
Following the above argumentation, we would argue that the establishment of 
branches and subsidiaries would be motivated by different factors and that they do not 
stay in direct competition to each other.
Table 3
Foreign bank entry into CE among OECD countries in breakdown by entry modes
Poland 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
a c q u i s i t i o n 24567 1 1 1 1 3612 5 8
b r a n c h 000000000022
s u b s i d i a r i e s 02230012100 1 1
Hungary
a c q u i s i t i o n 33373122000 2 4
b r a n c h 000000000000
s u b s i d i a r i e s 11310012010 1 0
Czech Republic
a c q u i s i t i o n 00004131100 1 0
b r a n c h 101000000002
s u b s i d i a r i e s 001000000001
Slovakia
a c q u i s i t i o n 00200122321 1 3
b r a n c h 000000000022
s u b s i d i a r i e s 140100000006
6RXUFHQDWLRQDOEDQNVQDWLRQDODQQXDOUHSRUWVRIWKH&RPPLVVLRQVIRUWKH%DQNLQJ6XSHUYLVLRQ
As mentioned already, the most common mode of penetrating the CE banking 
markets which became in the middle of 1990s was an acquisition of the existing banks. 
The entry through acquisitions was the quickest and the simplest mode of establishing 
presence in the CE countries. Mostly, it took place during the privatization process when 
the governments offered share in the domestic banks in order to save them or in exchange 
for the takeover of bad portfolios. This process lasted till the entrance of the CE countries 
into the EU. One reason for that were the administration restrictions imposed by the 
governments on the acquisition of majority stakes by foreign institutions. In the Czech 
Republic, for example, the acquisition of majority stakes to the strategic investors was 
abolished. Thus, foreign investors were able to buy only minority interests in the domestic 
banks in the first years (Bonin and Wachtel, 1999). The Hungarian banking law, on the 
other hand, required an agreement of the President of the National Bank on acquisition 
of stakes in a domestic bank above 10 per cent. However, it represented the most liberal 
licensing policy and the privatization process with the possibility of acquisition of majority Economic determinants contributing to FDI in CE banking sector
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later on. In Poland, the government started to sell majority shares of the state-owned 
banks to foreign investors at the end of the 1990s (NBP, 2001).
Tschoegl (2003) point out that the type of an organizational form chosen by foreign 
banks to expand is closely related to its strategy. He argues that the conditions which 
drew foreign banks to enter developing countries erode over time and then some will have 
to withdraw their local operations. Therefore, he distinguishes among others two types 
of banks’ strategies. First, prospectors who entered the foreign market either through 
VXEVLGLDU\RUMRLQWYHQWXUHV6HFRQGUHVWUXFWXUHVZKRDFTXLUHGODUJHGRPHVWLFEDQNVLQ
privatization process and treat their investments rather as long-term commitment. Tschoegl 
(2003) also argues that as foreign banks have no comparative advantage in retail banking 
vis-à-vis host country banks in the long-run perspective, the acquisition of the domestic 
banks can be the only possible method to get in this business and remain in it for certain, at 
least, medium term. In this sense, this mode of entry gave the entering foreign banks much 
greater comparative advantage as setting up a branch or subsidiary.
Table 4
Foreign bank entry into CE by country of origin in the years 1994-2004
Host
Home
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia
A u s t r a l i a  0000
A u s t r i a  2739
B e l g i u m  2241
C a n a d a  0000
C z e c h  R e p u b l i c   -031
D e n m a r k  0020
F i n l a n d  0000
F r a n c e 1340
Germany 3 11 17 3
G r e e c e 0000
H u n g a r y 0-01
I c e l a n d  0000
I r e l a n d 0030
I t a l y 1234
J a p a n 1020
L u x e m b u r g 0000
M e x i c o 0000
N e t h e r l a n d s 0281
N e w  Z e a l a n d   0000
N o r w a y 0000
Poland 0 0 - 0
P o r t u g a l 0040
S o u t h  K o r e a 0410
S p a i n 0010
S w e d e n 0060
S w i t z e r l a n d 0000
T u r k e y 0000
U n i t e d  K i n g d o m 1010
U n i t e d  S t a t e s 1391
Slovakia 1 0 0 -
Total 13 34 71 21
6RXUFHDQQXDOUHSRUWVQDWLRQDOFHQWUDOEDQNVDQGUHSRUWVRIVXSHUYLVLRQDXWKRULWLHVEconomic determinants contributing to FDI in CE banking sector
National Bank of Poland 26
4
Tables 3 and 4 show the number of foreign bank entries into the CE countries in 
breakdown by entry modes and entering countries during the period 1994-2004. As it can 
be seen, acquisitions have been the most favorite entry mode of the foreign banks into CE 
markets during the last years.
The high number of the yearly entries by acquisitions can be a result of the banking 
regulations and restrictions imposed by the governments in the CE countries on acquisition 
of majority stakes in the domestic banks and as well as other forms of entry. In the course 
of relaxing the restrictions, the same foreign banks could further increase their stakes 
in the domestic banks. An entry via subsidiary was the second most common mode of 
internationalization into the CE banking markets and dominated over the other methods 
mostly at the beginning and middle 1990s.
Table 3 shows also that Poland had the highest number of foreign bank entries. 
However, as we compare the assets of the foreign banks between individual banking 
VHFWRUVSUHVHQWHGLQWKHWDEOHZHFDQREVHUYHWKDWWKH&]HFK5HSXEOLFDQG6ORYDNLDDUH
among the CE countries with the highest share of the banking assets in the hands of the 
foreign banks. As table 4 shows those foreign banks came mainly from the neighbors’ 
countries of the CE countries in the past.
Table 5
Asset under majority foreign control as a share of the commercial bank assets (in %)
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Poland 3.2 4.2 13.7 15.3 16.6 47.2 69.5 68.7 67.4 67.8 66.9
Hungary N/A 41.8 46.2 53 64 66.4 68.1 70 90.7 83 77
Czech Republic N/A 16.0 20.0 24.0 26.0 39.0 75.4 93.3 94.2 95.9 91.8
Slovakia N/A 19.0 23.0 30.0 30.0 31.0 43 90.5 95.6 96.3 97
6RXUFH(XURVWDWData and Methodology




This section describes our data set and the two econometric methods that we use to assess 
the economic determinants of foreign bank expansion into the four CE countries. First, we 
employ Poisson regression with our sample for the four CE countries and the OECD countries 
RYHUWKH\HDUV6HFRQGLQRUGHUWRHYDOXDWHWKHHFRQRPLFGHWHUPLQDQWVDQGWKH
entry mode of a foreign bank into the CE market we use a bivariate probit model using our 
sample over the years 1994-2004. In our study we concentrate only on the OECD countries as 
almost all foreign banks operating in the CE region were from the OECD member countries. 
All variables employed in our analysis are presented in the Appendix.
5.1 Data
In our paper we evaluate the economic determinants of foreign bank entries and its entry 
modes into the four local banking markets in CE. In order to analyze those markets we use 
yearly data on countries and banks in the four CE countries, namely the Czech Republic, 
+XQJDU\3RODQG6ORYDNLDIRUWKHSHULRG7KHVHFRXQWULHVKDYHVKRZQZLGHO\
different policies towards the mode of foreign bank entry as we have presented above.
Our final sample contains 110 cross-border entries either by acquisitions or through 
establishing a new branch or subsidiary by a OECD foreign bank in one of the host countries. 
We established those transactions using public information as national and international 
press coverage and compared it with the list of foreign banks compiled by national bank 
supervisors.
In our study we define a foreign bank entry as to be followed by three forms: entry 
by setting up a branch, subsidiary or via acquisition.
We define a subsidiary or branch as a organizational form that received a domestic 
license or approval by domestic bank supervisory institution. The transformations of 
the already existing foreign banks, for example the transformations of branches into 
subsidiaries or vice versa are not considered as entry and therefore are not included in our 
analysis. We argue that they can be driven by other market determinants, which might not 
be observable for the non-existing foreign banks.
We define the engagement through acquisitions as a purchase of minimum of 5 per cent 
shares in a domestic bank by a foreign banking institution as well as opening of a subsidiary 
or branch by a foreign bank in a host country. An acquisition of 5 per cent by a foreign bank 
in a domestic bank will be seen as an first attempt to entry a host country. In our paper we 
are interested only in the horizontal foreign bank engagements, which are assumed to offer 
a broad potential for cost and profit efficiency improvements. Other types of transactions, 
such as government owned banks or other financial institutions acquiring a bank are excluded 
because they may be motivated by a different set of considerations. Moreover, our analysis 
does not include mergers or acquisitions of the domestic banks with other domestic banks.
5.2 Poisson regression
In order to analyze entry decisions into the CE countries, we consider the number of entries 
of foreign banks at year iLQWR3RODQG+XQJDU\&]HFK5HSXEOLFDQG6ORYDNLDLQEUHDNGRZQData and Methodology
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by a country of origin, conditioning on the specific groups of the regressors such as host-
country characteristics, physic relationship between host and home country and potential 
determinants of entering. In contrast to other analysis, we are not strongly interested in the 
characteristics of banks entering the CE countries as this area has been covered by many 
researchers whose work can also be applicable to the four countries in our study.5 Hence, 
we are mainly interested in answering the following questions:
a)   How much did the host-country characteristics and in particularly macroeconomic 
conditions matter in the entrance process of foreign banks into CE? Which of them 
did the foreign banks consider to be the most important?
b)   How much did the host-country banking regulations influence the number of foreign 
entries?
c)   Which of the suggested in the section two determinants of banking internationalization 
did the foreign banks mostly follow deciding on entry the CE countries?
Accordingly, we estimate the following choice model:









It is used to assuming that ’s are log-linearly dependent on the explanatory variables. 
Thus,
01 2 3 ln iht ht hit it iht KHB OE E E E H       (2)
where n=number of entering banks from country ^ into country ] at time i and N1]i,N2]i,
N3]i,…,N29]i have independent Poisson distribution with parameters L1]i,L2]i,L3]i,…,L29]i.
] KRVWFRXQWULHV+XQJDU\3RODQG&]HFK5HSXEOLF6ORYDNLD
^=entries from the sample (OECD countries) defined together as home countries
@]i=a vector of variables specific to the host country
=]^i=a vector of variables specific for the relationship between host country and 
home country
7^i=a vector of variables specific for the home countries
We estimate a model with a Poisson specification controlling for some unobserved 
country-and time-specific effects clustering the standard errors on the home country’s 
levels. Hence, our error term has one or two components depending on the specification: 
M^]i=E^]i+A] or M^]i=E^]i+A]+Qi.
We believe that a Poisson regression is the most appropriate specification of our 
model for several reasons. First, most empirical studies analyzing entries of foreign banks 
DQGWKHLUDFWLYLWLHVLQWKHKRVWFRXQWULHVXVH2UGLQDU\/HDVW6TXDUHV2/6DVHVWLPDWLRQ
methodology. However, it has been shown that omitting the countries which do not 
participate in the foreign banking may lead to inconsistent estimate parameters because 
RIORRVLQJLQIRUPDWLRQH[FOXGHGIURPWKHVDPSOH,QVXFKFDVHV2/6HVWLPDWHVDUH
ELDVHGWRZDUGV]HUR*UHHQH0RUHRYHUHPSOR\LQJWKH2/6UHJUHVVLRQVZKHUH
the dependent variable is a count variable seems to be inappropriate as one should 
explicitly account for this type of dependent variables and use the estimation techniques 
designed for it (Maddala, 1985). On the other hand, the non-linear methods allow us to 
take advantage of the larger number of observations and reduce the biasness. It is very 
useful particularly, when one investigates foreign bank entries into CE in the time-series 
context, where the number of individual foreign entries is small or zero. In the cases, 
where there is preponderance of zero or small values and the dependent variable is of 
discrete nature, we can improve on the least squares with a model that accounts for 
these characteristics (Greene, 2000).
5 An excellent literature survey presents Williams (2002).Data and Methodology
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Moreover, most studies examining the determinants of banking internationalization 
use, due to data unavailability, either time-series or cross-section structure of the data. 
Both are faced to some drawbacks, which do not allow us to take all results unambiguously. 
6LQFHWKHFURVVVHFWLRQVWXGLHVLJQRUHWKHWLPHVHULHVGLPHQVLRQRIWKHGDWDZKLFKPD\
result in the biasness of the estimates due to omitting the country-specific effects, the 
time-series studies, on the other hand, besides their attractive characteristics, suffer from 
the lack of availability of good-quality and sufficient length of the data needed for the 
purpose of the time-series analysis.
The new panel data techniques enable us to control for these shortcomings. They 
allow us to take advantage of the time dimension of the data as well as to estimate common 
relationships across countries. By introducing the country dummy variables we allow for 
controlling for the effects of those omitted variables that are specific either to individual 
CE country or are specific to each time-period. In each regression, we test for their jointly 
significance.
At the end we show that our results are robust to testing for significance of other 
explanatory variables used in the literature examining banking internationalization.
As far as the determinants of the entry modes are concerned, we use a bivariate 
seemingly unrelated probit specification. Unlike the other studies, we control explicitly for 
the correlation between particular entry modes and test whether any organizational form 
stayed in direct competition with others.
5.3 Bivariate probit regression
In our study we are also interested in the relation between economic determinants and 
entry modes of foreign banks into the CE countries. In particular, we are interested in 
changes between the determinants affecting particular organizational forms among the CE 
FRXQWULHV6LQFHWKHGHFLVLRQVDERXWSDUWLFXODUPRGHRIHQWU\PLJKWEHFRUUHODWHGDWWLPHi
within a home country, we have chosen a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit estimation 
685%ZKHUHWKHGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHLVRIWKHELQRPLQDOGLVFUHWHQDWXUHHLWKHURQHRU]HUR
Thus, the model takes a form:
Pr (Yiht =1) = f (Kht,Hiht,Bit) 
Pr (Yiht =1) = f (Kht,Hiht,Bit)
(3)
where N^]i equals one when an acquisition or opening a branch or subsidiary by a foreign 
bank from country ^ in a country ] occurs at year i versus an engagement through another 
operation mode from country ^ into country ] occurs at year i, otherwise zero.
As the equations are estimated simultaneously, we allow for the error terms to be 
correlated between the different engagement modes. The other vectors are the same as 
defined in the first specification.Results




This section presents the results of the Poisson regression and of the bivariate probit 
UHJUHVVLRQ)LUVWZHSUHVHQWWKHGHVFULSWLYHVWDWLVWLFVIRURXUVDPSOH6HFRQGZHGLVFXVVWKH
results of the Poisson regressions and we present the outcome of our robustness analysis. 
Finally, we show the results of our panel analysis using the bivariate probit estimations.
6.1 Descriptive statistics
Tables 6-9 provide summary statistics of our sample of OECD countries. Table 6 shows the 
data representing economic characteristic of the 30 OECD countries in the period 1994-2004. 
The table presents the economic characteristics of those countries with no foreign direct 
investment in the CE, as well of those OECD countries with foreign bank entry into the CE.
Table 6
OECD countries summary characteristics
All OECD countries Obs. Median Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Bank freedom index 1276 2.000 2.136 0.815 1.000 3.000
Liquid liabilities 1276 52.305 51.834 12.405 27.970 70.000
Creditor rights 1276 3.875 3.926 0.510 3.250 5.000
Corporate tax rate 1276 31.000 30.455 8.204 18.000 41.000
Exchange rate 1276 37.405 75.272 88.850 2.690 260.040
Log inflation 1276 2.169 1.965 1.018 -2.303 3.506
Concentration ratio 1276 60.500 59.870 8.513 42.900 79.000
Bank deposit 1276 44.960 45.006 11.548 23.090 61.510
Net interest margin 1276 3.795 4.030 1.349 2.040 7.440
Difference in overheads 1212 3.810 3.832 1.307 1.893 9.703
Log distance 1276 7.303 7.509 1.113 5.241 9.808
Difference in growth rates 1276 -0.700 -0.513 3.014 -13.100 12.400
Lag of non-financial FDI 1015 3.500 4.565 2.953 1.340 13.480
OECD countries with no bank expansion into CE
Bank freedom index 1166 2.000 2.112 0.818 1.000 3.000
Liquid liabilities 1166 55.610 52.419 12.339 27.970 70.000
Creditor rights 1166 4.000 3.953 0.510 3.250 5.000
Corporate tax rate 1166 31.000 30.507 8.251 18.000 41.000
Exchange rate 1166 37.920 76.259 88.887 2.690 260.040
Log inflation 1166 2.152 1.940 1.036 -2.303 3.506
Concentration ratio 1166 61.000 60.233 8.384 42.900 79.000
Bank deposit  1166 50.090  45.537 11.493 23.090 61.510
Net interest margin 1166 3.760 3.996 1.359 2.040 7.440
Difference in overheads 1102 3.793 3.809 1.328 1.893 9.703
Log distance 1166 7.374 7.548 1.117 5.241 9.808
Difference in growth rates 1166 -0.700 -0.457 3.057 -13.100 12.400
Lag of non-financial FDI 928 4.020 4.633 2.982 1.340 13.480Results
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OECD countries with bank expansion into CE
Bank freedom index 110 3.000 2.391 0.731 1.000 3.000
Liquid liabilities to GDP 110 43.000 45.636 11.417 27.970 69.000
Credit rights 110 3.750 3.645 0.417 3.250 5.000
Corporate tax rate 110 30.000 29.900 7.703 19.000 40.000
Exchange rate 110 34.040 64.810 88.184 2.690 260.040
Inflation 110 2.313 2.226 0.766 -0.357 3.506
Concentration ratio 110 54.350 56.033 8.954 42.900 79.000
Bank deposit 110 37.100 39.377 10.638 23.090 61.450
Net interest margin 110 4.300 4.388 1.189 2.130 7.440
Diff. in overheads 110 3.935 4.066 1.049 2.174 9.673
Distance 110 6.877 7.095 0.994 5.241 9.100
Diff. in growth rates 110 -1.100 -1.105 2.448 -7.500 7.700
Non-financial FDI 87 3.000 3.835 2.515 1.370 13.480
6RXUFHRZQFRPSXWDWLRQ
In table 7 we present the economic characteristics splitting the OECD countries 
VDPSOHXVLQJRXU&(KRVWFRXQWULHV3RODQG+XQJDU\WKH&]HFK5HSXEOLFDQG6ORYDNLD
Table 7
OECD countries summary characteristics by CE countries
Poland Obs. Median Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Bank freedom index 319 3.000 2.727 0.446 2.000 3.000
Liquid liabilities 319 37.160 35.993 5.449 27.970 42.970
Creditor rights 319 3.250 3.341 0.193 3.250 3.750
Corporate tax rate 319 34.000 32.727 6.562 19.000 40.000
Exchange rate 319 3.850 3.803 0.545 2.690 4.530
Inflation 319 2.313 2.072 1.138 -0.357 3.506
Concentration ratio 319 48.800 49.509 3.535 42.900 54.700
Bank deposit 319 31.910 30.685 5.306 23.090 37.540
Net interest margin 319 4.650 5.205 1.343 3.600 7.440
Difference in overheads 303 3.941 3.914 0.608 2.712 4.898
Distance 319 7.281 7.552 1.045 5.919 9.784
Diff. in growth rates 319 -1.100 -1.267 2.730 -13.100 6.600
Lag of non-financial FDI 290 2.370 2.488 0.846 1.370 4.420
Hungary
Bank freedom index 319 2.000 2.182 0.386 2.000 3.000
Liquid liabilities 319 45.000 45.091 1.732 43.000 49.000
Credit rights 319 3.750 3.750 0.000 3.750 3.750
Corporate tax rate 319 20.000 19.818 0.576 18.000 20.000
Exchange rate 319 242.970 222.561 43.044 124.780 260.040
Inflation 319 2.303 2.448 0.572 1.548 3.339
Concentration ratio 319 55.000 56.164 3.858 52.100 65.300
Bank deposit  319 37.610 37.903 0.999 36.470 39.830
Net interest margin 319 4.790 4.758 0.712 3.760 5.700
Difference in overheads 303 4.581 4.583 0.426 3.833 5.272
Distance 319 7.436 7.566 1.099 5.241 9.791
Diff. in growth rates 319 -0.400 -0.367 2.650 -11.700 8.100
Lag of non-financial FDI 145 3.500 3.840 1.637 1.740 6.730Results
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Czech Republic
Bank freedom index 319 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Liquid liabilities  319 66.000 65.909 3.034 60.000 70.000
Creditor rights 319 4.000 4.341 0.374 4.000 4.750
Corporate tax rate 319 35.000 34.545 4.214 28.000 41.000
Exchange rate 319 34.100 34.125 1.847 30.810 36.890
Inflation 319 1.548 1.288 1.295 -2.303 2.370
Concentration ratio 319 66.000 67.127 3.167 64.000 75.500
Bank deposit  319 57.700 57.852 2.538 53.290 61.510
Net interest margin 319 2.890 3.011 1.024 2.040 5.500
Difference in overheads 303 2.425 3.019 1.104 1.893 5.806
Distance 319 7.231 7.409 1.168 5.688 9.808
Diff. in growth rates 319 0.400 0.795 3.253 -12.100 12.400
Lag of non-financial FDI 290 4.855 4.838 2.841 1.340 9.490
Slovakia
Bank freedom index 319 3.000 2.636 0.644 1.000 3.000
Liquid liabilities  319 60.190 60.344 2.533 55.610 64.420
Creditor rights 319 4.000 4.273 0.446 4.000 5.000
Corporate tax rate 319 40.000 34.727 7.411 19.000 40.000
Exchange rate 319 40.050 40.601 2.205 37.920 44.100
Inflation 319 2.015 2.050 0.379 1.194 2.595
Concentration ratio 319 66.400 66.682 5.686 59.000 79.000
Bank deposit  319 53.640 53.585 1.839 50.090 56.880
Net interest margin 319 2.870 3.145 0.442 2.670 3.990
Difference in overheads 303 3.086 3.813 1.959 2.473 9.703
Distance 319 7.374 7.510 1.136 5.241 9.792
Diff. in growth rates 319 -1.500 -1.212 2.926 -12.000 9.300
Lag of non-financial FDI 290 6.080 6.731 3.330 1.930 13.480
6RXUFHRZQFRPSXWDWLRQ
6LPLODUDVLQWDEOHZHGLYLGHGDOVRWKHVDPSOHLQFRXQWULHVZLWKIRUHLJQHQWU\LQWR
CE and not. Table 8 presents the economic characteristics of those OECD countries without 
any foreign direct investment in the financial services in the CE region.
Table 8
OECD countries summary characteristics with no bank expansions by CE countries
Poland Obs. Median Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Bank freedom index 267 3.000 2.712 0.454 2.000 3.000
Liquid liabilities 267 37.160 35.899 5.553 27.970 42.970
Creditor rights 267 3.250 3.351 0.201 3.250 3.750
Corporate tax rate 267 34.000 32.719 6.741 19.000 40.000
Exchange rate 267 3.850 3.780 0.564 2.690 4.530
Inflation 267 2.313 2.057 1.186 -0.357 3.506
Concentration ratio 267 48.800 49.699 3.534 42.900 54.700
Bank deposit 267 31.910 30.587 5.393 23.090 37.540
Net interest margin 267 4.650 5.237 1.390 3.600 7.440
Difference in overheads 251 3.939 3.878 0.611 2.712 4.889
Distance 267 7.291 7.609 1.066 5.919 9.784
Diff. in growth rates 267 -1.100 -1.247 2.817 -13.100 6.600
Lag of non-financial FDI 239 2.370 2.449 0.866 1.370 4.420Results
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Hungary
Bank freedom index 292 2.000 2.182 0.386 2.000 3.000
Liquid liabilities 292 45.000 45.134 1.741 43.000 49.000
Creditor rights 292 3.750 3.750 0.000 3.750 3.750
Corporate tax rate 292 20.000 19.801 0.599 18.000 20.000
Exchange rate 292 242.970 223.489 43.186 124.780 260.040
Inflation 292 2.303 2.419 0.575 1.548 3.339
Concentration ratio 292 55.000 56.089 3.883 52.100 65.300
Bank deposit 292 37.610 37.943 1.014 36.470 39.830
Net interest margin 292 4.790 4.791 0.711 3.760 5.700
Difference in overheads 276 4.592 4.613 0.425 3.833 5.272
Distance 292 7.486 7.587 1.101 5.241 9.791
Diff. in growth rates 292 -0.400 -0.368 2.656 -11.700 8.100
Lag of non-financial FDI 138 3.500 3.860 1.675 1.740 6.730
Czech Republic
Bank freedom index 306 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Liquid liabilities 306 66.000 65.990 3.010 60.000 70.000
Credit rights 306 4.000 4.343 0.374 4.000 4.750
Corporate tax rate 306 35.000 34.552 4.256 28.000 41.000
Exchange rate 306 34.100 34.085 1.847 30.810 36.890
Inflation 306 1.548 1.273 1.313 -2.303 2.370
Concentration ratio 306 66.000 67.137 3.181 64.000 75.500
Bank deposit  306 57.700 57.912 2.535 53.290 61.510
Net interest margin 306 2.890 2.995 1.009 2.040 5.500
Difference in overheads 290 2.422 2.987 1.085 1.893 5.806
Distance 306 7.231 7.439 1.161 5.688 9.808
Diff. in growth rates 306 0.550 0.816 3.292 -12.100 12.400
Lag of non-financial FDI 278 4.510 4.819 2.857 1.340 9.490
Slovakia
Bank freedom index 301 3.000 2.645 0.635 1.000 3.000
Liquid liabilities 301 60.190 60.344 2.519 55.610 64.420
Credit rights 301 4.000 4.286 0.453 4.000 5.000
Corporate tax rate 301 40.000 34.817 7.352 19.000 40.000
Exchange rate 301 40.050 40.599 2.210 37.920 44.100
Inflation 301 2.015 2.049 0.379 1.194 2.595
Concentration ratio 301 66.400 66.576 5.704 59.000 79.000
Bank deposit 301 53.640 53.587 1.830 50.090 56.880
Net interest margin 301 2.870 3.142 0.442 2.670 3.990
Difference in overheads 285 3.086 3.805 1.952 2.473 9.703
Distance 301 7.400 7.569 1.128 5.241 9.792
Diff. in growth rates 301 -1.400 -1.136 2.951 -12.000 9.300
Non-financial FDI 273 6.080 6.747 3.305 1.930 13.480
6RXUFHRZQFRPSXWDWLRQ
While, in table 9 we present the economic characteristic of the OECD countries with 
operation in the CE region.Results
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Table 9
OECD country summary characteristics with bank expansion by CE countries
Poland Obs. Median Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Bank freedom index 52 3.000 2.808 0.398 2.000 3.000
Liquid liabilities 52 37.160 36.477 4.899 27.970 42.970
Creditor rights 52 3.250 3.288 0.135 3.250 3.750
Corporate tax rate 52 34.000 32.769 5.610 19.000 40.000
Exchange rate 52 3.920 3.918 0.426 2.690 4.530
Log inflation 52 2.313 2.149 0.860 -0.357 3.506
Concentration ratio 52 47.700 48.533 3.408 42.900 54.700
Bank deposit 52 31.910 31.192 4.853 23.090 37.540
Net interest margin 52 4.650 5.045 1.069 3.600 7.440
Difference in overheads 52 4.027 4.086 0.565 2.728 4.898
Log distance 52 7.048 7.263 0.889 6.065 9.051
Difference in growth rates 52 -1.050 -1.371 2.249 -7.500 4.900
Lag of non-financial FDI 51 2.610 2.668 0.728 1.370 4.420
Hungary
Bank freedom index 27 2.000 2.185 0.396 2.000 3.000
Liquid liabilities 27 44.000 44.630 1.597 43.000 49.000
Creditor rights 27 3.750 3.750 0.000 3.750 3.750
Corporate tax rate 27 20.000 20.000 0.000 20.000 20.000
Exchange rate 27 210.930 212.528 40.910 124.780 260.040
Log inflation 27 2.907 2.757 0.451 1.548 3.339
Concentration ratio 27 56.000 56.974 3.533 52.100 65.300
Bank deposit  27 37.470 37.469 0.708 36.470 39.150
Net interest margin 27 4.040 4.404 0.630 3.760 5.630
Difference in overheads 27 4.187 4.278 0.304 3.856 4.939
Log distance 27 7.081 7.341 1.078 6.224 9.098
Difference in growth rates 27 -1.100 -0.348 2.640 -3.100 7.700
Lag of non-financial FDI 7 3.500 3.450 0.290 3.210 4.020
Czech Republic
Bank freedom index 13 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Liquid liabilities 13 63.000 64.000 3.082 60.000 69.000
Credit rights 13 4.000 4.288 0.380 4.000 4.750
Corporate tax rate 13 35.000 34.385 3.203 31.000 39.000
Exchange rate 13 35.610 35.051 1.647 30.810 36.890
Log inflation 13 1.548 1.654 0.684 0.588 2.370
Concentration ratio 13 66.000 66.892 2.923 64.400 75.500
Bank deposit 13 55.920 56.437 2.275 53.290 61.450
Net interest margin 13 2.890 3.393 1.320 2.130 5.500
Difference in overheads 13 3.382 3.730 1.323 2.174 5.795
Log distance 13 6.667 6.717 1.162 5.688 9.100
Difference in growth rates 13 0.000 0.292 2.173 -3.200 5.400
Lag of non-financial FDI 12 5.200 5.268 2.503 1.780 8.170Results
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Slovakia
Bank freedom index 18 3.000 2.500 0.786 1.000 3.000
Liquid liabilities 18 61.440 60.344 2.827 55.610 64.420
Credit rights 18 4.000 4.056 0.236 4.000 5.000
Corporate tax rate 18 40.000 33.222 8.420 19.000 40.000
Exchange rate 18 40.050 40.637 2.177 37.920 44.100
Log inflation 18 2.083 2.067 0.400 1.194 2.595
Concentration ratio 18 66.500 68.444 5.223 59.000 79.000
Bank deposit 18 53.890 53.563 2.041 50.090 56.880
Net interest margin 18 2.870 3.189 0.449 2.670 3.990
Difference in overheads 18 3.085 3.933 2.131 2.493 9.673
Log distance 18 6.374 6.516 0.768 5.241 9.079
Difference in growth rates 18 -3.200 -2.483 2.148 -5.200 1.600
Lag of non-financial FDI 17 5.110 6.481 3.823 1.930 13.480
6RXUFHRZQFRPSXWDWLRQ
6.2 Poisson regression results
This section presents our Poisson regression results. In table 10 we present the results for 
foreign bank entry into the CE countries. We regress the dependent variable first against 
country economic determinants and then progressively add our additional control variables. 
Table 10 shows the results with a different set of independent variables in regressions 
(1)-(4). The Poisson regressions reveal that some of our economic determinants may have 
a positive and statistical significant impact on the entry decision of foreign banks into the 
CE countries.
In the regression (1) of the 1276 observations in the sample we lost 64 observations 
due to the missing data on overheads in the home countries. In the regression (2)-(4) we 
lost additionally 261 observations because we missed some data on non-financial FDIs for 
Hungary. In all four specifications we included dummies with respect to the host country 
in order to control for the effects of those omitted characteristics which are specific to 
the individual CE countries. We test also if those effects are significant and can explain 
the variations in the foreign banking between these countries. Additionally, in regression 
(3) we added a time-effect and test if the determinants of entering into CE have changed 
across time.
In the regression (1), the coefficients of two of three country-characteristics variables 
are significantly different from zero. As expected, the tax rate is negatively correlated with 
the expected number of foreign banks’ entries into CE countries, although, it seems not 
to be economic significant in the regression. The reason might be that this variable may 
capture two opposite effects. First, the higher tax rate may discourage foreign banks to 
HQWHUHVSHFLDOO\E\HQWU\PRGHVIDOOLQJXQGHUWKHORFDOWD[DWLRQ6HFRQGWKHKLJKHUWD[UDWH
may encourage foreign entrants to choose particular entry modes which gave a possibility 
to foreign banks to be exempted from local taxation or could repatriate their profits to the 
parent banks.
As expected, the exchange rate shows a negative correlation with the expected 
number of entries of foreign banks into CE and is highly significant. The negative sign of 
this variable may indicate that with the depreciation of the foreign currency, the foreign 
banks started searching for possibilities for great profits which occurred in the CE markets. 
The positive correlation between inflation and the expected number of the foreign banks 
entering into CE was surprising. Yet, taking into account that high inflation rates in the CE 
countries were associated with high net interest margins, this variable may capture the 
effect of great profit opportunities on the CE banking markets rather than its negative Results
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impact on the economy. This result is also consistent with other findings of the literature 
on this topic. For example, Demirgüç-Kunt (1998) et al. find that inflation is associated 
with higher realized interest margins and thus higher profitability of banks, especially in 
the developing countries. This finding they explain by the fact that in developing countries 
demand deposits frequently pay zero or below market interest rates. On the hand, in the 
period of high inflation when the entries of most foreign banks occurred, the monetary 
policy targets of the CE countries were already set and the specific measures to achieve 
them were identified.
The measure capturing the differences in the economic development between home 
and host country turned out, on the other hand, not to be statistically significant, although 
it has an expected a negative coefficient. It indicates that the higher the growths rate of 
the host country in comparison with the home country, the higher the expected number of 
foreign banks entering the CE countries.
The size of the banking sector and financial sector appear to be statistical significant. 
6LQFHWKHEDQNGHSRVLWVDUHSRVLWLYHO\FRUUHODWHGZLWKWKHH[SHFWHGQXPEHURIEDQN
entries, consistent with the hypothesis, the larger domestic banking sector, the greater 
number of potential clients and thus better prospects for great profits. The second variable 
measuring the level of intermediation of a country has a negative correlation with the 
banking internationalization into CE. We interpret this as evidence that with the greater 
development of the financial sectors of the CE countries, which means a wider range of 
financial products and services outside a banking sector, the demand for banking products 
begins to decline.
The coefficient of the concentration level of the banking sector is economically 
significant and shows a negative correlation with the expected number of entering banks. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, the result indicates that high concentration of the banking 
markets hinders new entries of foreign banks.
 The net interest margin is negatively correlated with the expected number of entries 
of the foreign banks. The impact of this variable remains also statistically significant. The 
low interest income of the banking sector suggested high potential of the credit markets in 
the CE countries and thus great profit opportunities from the retail and wholesale banking 
for the new entrants.
The variable measuring the legal and regulatory structure of the CE banking markets, 
the bank freedom index has, as expected, a negative sign, although it is insignificant. 
Possibly it is because all CE countries were considered by foreign institutions to have similar 
regulatory structure and other country-characteristics and location specific factors played 
a decisive role in an entry process into a particular country.
On the other hand, the variable capturing the effects of the improvement in the 
creditor rights is significant and negatively correlated with the expected number of banks 
entering the CE countries. The reason could be that most of the foreign bank entries 
occurred in a period of poor creditor rights protection.
The difference in the efficiency of the banking markets seemed not to be a driving 
factor to an entry of foreign banks into CE countries although it indicates a negative sign. It 
means that the higher the inefficiency of the banking market relative to the home market, 
the higher probability of an entry. Possibly it is a result of opposite effects of this variable 
on an entry. Once more inefficient banking markets may encourage acquisition entries 
consistent with the hypothesis that foreign investors may use their expertise in order to 
restructure inefficient banks, the inefficient banking markets may, on the other hand, 
discourage greenfield investments.
The results of the regression provide also evidence that the law of origin of the 
entering country is of great economic importance. The legal origin variables are significant 
even at the one percentage significance level. This result is also consistent with other Results
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findings in the literature that foreign banks are more willing to locate their operations in 
the countries which share the same legal origin (Galindo et al., 2002).
Conditioning our regression on the dummy if a country belongs to the EU or not, 
we can see that joining the EU exerts a negative effect on the number of entries of foreign 
banks into CE countries. It is also statistically significant. This negative impact is possibly 
because of the fact that since joining the EU creates many new opportunities, the banking 
markets of the CE countries had been already penetrated by the foreign banks leaving the 
new entrants a limited room to step in.
Finally, consistent with other literature, our result shows that the distance between 
home and host country is economic important in determining an entry decision. In the 
regression the variable is statistically significant even at the one percentage level. The 
negative correlation with the foreign banking suggests that banks from neighboring 
countries were more expected to enter the CE’s banking markets.
As a goodness of fit measure we perform Pearson test which in each specification 
was highly insignificant suggesting that our data are indeed Poisson distributed (the results 
are not reported here).
The regression (2) reports the estimates of the specification that includes non-
financial FDIs (lag), testing the hypothesis that the foreign banks were motivated to enter 
the CE countries by following their customers and providing them their services on site. 
Although the coefficient of this variable appears in the regression as insignificant, it has 
an expected positive sign. The inclusion of the inflow of non-financial FDIs has resulted in 
some changes in the significance of the coefficients as well as has changed the sign of one 
of the variables. We see that the estimate of the exchange rate becomes positive, as we 
would expect, however insignificant. The coefficient may reflect two different effects in the 
regressions. In the (1) regression the exchange rate was significant at the one percentage 
level because since we did not control for other motives of foreign banks’ entries into CE 
than motives driven by great profit opportunities, the appreciation of the local currencies 
encouraged the foreign entrants willing to take advantage from the strong currency. 
However, as we include the non-financial FDIs and take into consideration the fact that 
depreciation of the currency creates great prices for the foreign investors, many foreign 
banks followed the FDIs in the period of great depreciation of the local currencies.
The insignificance of the concentration level of the banking sectors of the CE 
countries as determinant of number of foreign bank entries can be explained possibly by 
two offsetting effects. First, the higher concentration level of the banking sector could 
have a negative effect on the number of entries of foreign banks where the established 
UHWDLODQGZKROHVDOHVWUXFWXUHZDVGHVLUHG6HFRQGWKHKLJKHUFRQFHQWUDWLRQOHYHOFRXOG
indicate under-banked and under-serviced markets and thus could exert positive effects on 
foreign banks following their clients.
The economic significance of the differences in the growth rates between host 
and home country after inclusion of the volume of the FDIs in the non-financial sector we 
interpret as the evidence that the countries, which suffered from low economic growth 
were more expected to search for the opportunities in the CE countries.
In the (2) regression the variable measuring the regulatory structure of the banking 
markets in the CE countries becomes an important determinant of entry of the foreign 
banks into these countries. We think that this is due to the fact that dummies with respect 
to the country of entry remain jointly insignificant (compare regression (1), (2), (3) and (4)) 
rather than due to inclusion of the non-financial FDIs. The reason might be that since the 
omitted characteristics between the CE countries disappear, the entry into that country 
was more probable that imposed lower restrictions on foreign banks’ entries.
Regression (3) presents the results of the regression after the inclusion of the 
time-specific effects. We see that the results do not differ strongly from the ones of the Results
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regression (2). Interesting is, however, the improvement of the significance level of the non-
financial FDIs, which may suggest that the foreign banks followed their customers entering 
the CE countries only at a certain point of time. In order to test for it, we include in the 
next regression an interactive term. The parameter estimates for three interactive terms are 
QHJDWLYHDQGKLJKO\VLJQLILFDQWVXJJHVWLQJWKDWWKHĴIROORZWKHFXVWRPHUK\SRWKHVLVĵZDV
not realized at the eve of the EU accession of the CE countries. The parameter estimate for 
the non-financial FDIs on its own is, however, positive and highly significant. It may indicate 
that the foreign banks followed their customers only at the beginning of the transition 
process. We can also see that after inclusion of the interactive terms, two variables have 
changed their significance. The exchange rate becomes significant at the one percentage 
significance level but the net interest margin looses its economic significance. It may 
indicate that the foreign banks following their customers could benefit also from the great 
depreciation of the currencies of the CE countries. The insignificance of the net interest 
margin may suggest that retail and wholesale banking activities gained an importance in 
the course of time. Finally, the results suggest that the determinants motivating the foreign 
banks to enter the CE countries have changed across time.
6.2.1 Robustness analysis
We next conduct a number of robustness tests. We test for the significance of other 
explanatory variables, which may explain foreign banking entry and have been also 
presented in the literature. Additionally, we check whether our results are robust to 
different econometric techniques. We begin our robustness analysis with the regression (1) 
and include new control variables. In the regression (6), we estimated our model with the 
ordered logit and in the regression (7) with Tobit. The empirical literature points out some 
advantageous of these two econometric techniques for the type of observations which 
we use in the regression. The results of new estimation are reported in the table 11. The 
results show that none of the covariates is significant even at 10 percentage level and their 
inclusion does not affect our previous results.
Table 10
The determinants of a bank’s decision to expand into CE countries
The dependent variable is equal to the number of foreign banks by country of origin. In each regression we included also 
country dummies; In the regression (3) we included dummies with respect to the time of entering. The results are not 
reported. Regression (4) was regressed on interactive terms: fdinonlag*dummy of year. We report that variables, which are 
statistically significant.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exchange rate -0.0276*** 0.0850 0.1049 0.1178***
(0.0087) (0.0538) (0.0704) (0.0400)
Inflation 0.3402*** 0.7829*** 1.0510** 1.1431**
(0.1203) (0.2712) (0.3446) (0.4703)
Tax rate -0.0453 0.0501 -0.0438 -0.0845
(0.0449) (0.0576) (0.0522) (0.1031)
Bank freedom index -0.4225 -1.4793** -1.2986 -2.0571
(0.4072) (0.6660) (1.1241) (1.2678)
Creditor rights -1.6585*** -1.4742*** -1.3578** -1.4094***
(0.4902) (0.4902) (0.6600) (0.4286)
Liquid liabilities -0.4307** -0.8816*** -0.9110*** -0.8652**
(0.1741) (0.2748) (0.3439) (0.4001)
Bank deposits 0.3948 0.9087*** 0.9070** 0.9320**
(0.2117) (0.3092) (0.3962) (0.4601)
Concentration ratio -0.0527** -0.0123 -0.0104 -0.0614
(0.0263) (0.0351) (0.0726) (0.0835)Results
WORKING PAPER No. 50 39
6
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net interest margin -0.4232*** -0.6221** -0.8631** -0.4954
(0.1623) (0.2530) (0.4023) (0.3440)
Diff. in growth rates -0.0822 -0.1290*** -0.1260*** -0.1297**
(0.0574) (0.0484) (0.0477) (0.0508)
Diff. in overheads -0.0891 -0.1004 -0.0979 -0.1254
(0.1105) (0.1160) (0.1264) (0.1388)
Distance -0.7091*** -0.7617*** -0.7525*** -0.7358***
(0.2191) (0.2486) (0.2476) (0.2448)
Non-financial FDI (lag) - 0.0984 0.1453 0.9345**
(0.0940) (0.1063) (0.4605)
English legal origin 2.1870*** 2.2097*** 2.1933*** 2.1283***
(0.7380) (0.6934) (0.7011) (0.6897)
German legal origin 2.5333*** 2.1406*** 2.1377*** 2.0718***
(0.5538) (0.5493) (0.5589) (0.5599)
French legal origin 1.6339*** 1.4131*** 1.4150*** 1.3744***
(0.5448) (0.5358) (0.5378) (0.5301)
Scandinavian legal origin 0.9189 0.8723 0.8725 0.8262
(0.7941) (0.7701) (0.7801) (0.7705)
EU dummy -0.9172** -0.2890 -1.9321 -1.0557







No. of observations 1212 973 973 973
Log likelihood value -360.0716 -282.1786 -278.2254 -273.9627
Wald test 0.0535 0.1823 0.0132/0.0010* 0.0007
***, **, * denote that the coefficient is significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. t statistics based on robust 
standard errors in parenthesis. The first result refers to the significance of the country dummies; the second to the time-effect.
The national income per capita is used as a measure of a host country’s purchasing 
power and thus demand for the banking services. The coefficient of this variable is negative 
and insignificant. This is possibly because of the two offset effects. The measure of the 
country risk, as before, is highly insignificant although shows a positive sign. It is consistent 
with the hypothesis the higher the index (lower a country risk), the higher expected number 
of foreign banks entries. The coefficient for the stock market as expected is positive 
suggesting that the foreign banks entries are positively correlated with the stock market 
development. However, the variable is statistically insignificant. Thus, we include instead the 
stock market capitalization and also this time the coefficient was positive, yet insignificant. 
Finally, we included a measure of the size of country proxied by the population of the host 
country. The coefficient of this variable was positive, but again insignificant.
6.3 Results of bivariate probit regression
In the table 12 we present results from a simple univariate probit estimation conducted 
on the pooled data where we compare the coefficients for all types of entry modes. Each 
Table 10 (cont’d)Results
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equation from the previous regression (2) is estimated separately. The error terms are 
clustered on the home country’s level.
To analyze the inferences in greater detail, we compare further the coefficients 
on determinants affecting the presence of branches with respect to acquisitions and 
subsidiaries as well as subsidiaries with respect to branches. This gives us a picture of 
comparative influences of the different factors on the choice of entry mode. Moreover, by 
considering what interdependencies between the banking forms are consistent with the 
empirical literature, the model shows how different forms of banking activity compete or 
complement one another and what pattern of competition or complementation between 
banking forms created the banking structure of the CE countries. Unlike other studies on 
this presented in the literature, we employ the model which directly control for it. The 
results are shown in table 13.
In table 14 we examine further the subsidiaries versus acquisitions, as these modes 
dominated in the entrance process of foreign banks into CE. Moreover, as their activities 
could overlap to some extent we feel that these forms could compete with each other 
in some areas. Moreover, in table 14 in the regression (2) and (3) we included also non-
financial FDIs, although the literature on international banking treats the trade variable and 
QRQILQDQFLDO)',VH[FKDQJHDEOHDVSUR[LHVIRUĴIROORZWKHFXVWRPHUK\SRWKHVLVĵ+RZHYHU
we follow Miller and Parkhe’s (1998) approach who argue that since the bilateral trade can 
be positively correlated with different modes of entry, the non-financial FDIs could explain 
the foreign entries through subsidiaries. We present in table 14 in the regression (3) the 
results of the regression with the country effect in order to examine if any unobserved and 
omitted characteristics of the countries may explain additionally the differences in foreign 
bank entries between the countries.
Table 11
Robustness check of the determinants of a bank’s decision to expand into CE countries
The dependent variable is equal to the number of foreign banks by country of origin. In the regressions the additional 
control variable is in: (1) income per capita; (2) country risk; (3) turnover ratio; (4) market capitalization and (5) population. 
In regressions (6) and (7) we estimated the model using Tobit and ordered logit, respectively. In each regression we included 
also country dummies.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exchange rate 0.0481 0.1068 0.0761 0.0723 0.0854 0.0883 0.0770
(0.0599) (0.0682) (0.0623) (0.0547) (0.0534) (0.0839) (0.0632)
Inflation 0.7641*** 0.7987*** 0.8295*** 0.7809*** 0.7819*** 0.9597*** 1.0381***
(0.2804) (0.2720) (0.2697) (0.2750) (0.2736) (0.3635) (0.3551)
Tax rate 0.0176 0.0496 0.0453 0.0539 0.0494 0.0220 0.0399
(0.0496) (0.0588) (0.0604) (0.0605) (0.0586) (0.0735) (0.0744)
Bank freedom 
index
-1.7332** -1.4884** -1.6291*** -1.5565** -1.4749** -1.3871* -1.7321**
(0.8279) (0.6689) (0.6163) (0.6809) (0.6612) (0.7854) (0.8571)
Creditor rights -1.5506*** -1.4323*** -1.4674*** -1.4481*** -1.4643*** -1.4761** -1.6022***
(0.4667) (0.4929) (0.4880) (0.47989 (0.4806) (0.6318) (0.5942)
Liquid liabilities -0.8359*** -0.9345*** -0.9243*** -0.8777*** -0.8824*** -0.9469*** -1.0231***
(0.2732) (0.2764) (0.2988) (0.2774) (0.2724) (0.2872) (0.3372)
Bank deposits 0.9012*** 0.9667*** 0.9550*** 0.9071*** 0.9109*** 0.9635*** 1.0462***
(0.3175) (0.3127) (0.3375) (0.3106) (0.3037) (0.3231) (0.3839)
Concentration 
ratio
-0.0400 -0.0094 -0.0107 -0.0086 -0.0115 -0.0065 -0.0171
(0.0366) (0.0364) (0.0342) (0.0340) (0.0361) (0.0457) (0.0475)
Net interest 
margin
-0.6181** -0.6446*** -0.6405*** -0.5924** -0.6191** -0.7638*** -0.8898**
(0.2625) (0.2427) (0.2469) (0.2578) (0.2631) (0.2928) (0.3861)Results
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Diff. in growth 
rates
-0.1252*** -0.1263*** -0.1259*** -0.1285*** -0.1288*** -0.1349** -0.1410**
(0.0478) (0.0493) (0.0479) (0.0479) (0.0487) (0.0569) (0.0603)
Diff. in 
overheads
-0.1014 -0.1009 -0.0899 -0.1034 -0.1002 -0.1047 -0.1531
(0.1167) (0.1156) (0.1314) (0.1173) (0.1163) (0.0865) (0.1432)
Distance -0.7598*** -0.7624*** -0.7581*** -0.7602*** -0.7617*** -0.8651*** -0.8945***
(0.2470) (0.2478) (0.2498) (0.2471) (0.2486) (0.1749) (0.2564)
Non-financial 
FDI
0.1376 0.1107 0.1018 0.1097 0.0980 0.0386 0.0530
(0.1124) (0.0981) (0.0963) (0.1025) (0.0945) (0.0942) (0.1133)
English legal 
origin
2.2012*** 2.2061*** 2.2100*** 2.2053*** 2.2099*** 2.3466*** 2.2738***
(0.6963) (0.6922) (0.6963) (0.6945) (0.6935) (0.6623) (0.7709)
German legal 
origin
2.1434*** 2.1416*** 2.1431*** 2.1422*** 2.1409*** 2.4118*** 2.4560***
(0.5522) (0.5490) (0.5538) (0.5487) (0.5495) (0.5341) (0.7536)
French legal 
origin
1.4152*** 1.4137*** 1.4214*** 1.4135*** 1.4133*** 1.4624*** 1.4776**
(0.5392) (0.5348) (0.5448) (0.5352) (0.5353) (0.5159) (0.5974)
Scandinavian 
legal origin
0.8725 0.8740 0.8709 0.8730 0.8727 0.6171 0.7298
(0.7722) (0.7676) (0.7737) (0.7702) (0.7692) (0.6086) (0.7937)
EU dummy -0.0216 -0.2115 -0.3801 -0.2604 -0.2884 -0.8344 -0.8886
(0.9161) (0.8072) (0.7385) (0.7736) (0.7466) (1.0065) (0.9699)
Additional 
control variable
-0.0003 0.0321 0.0030 0.0215 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0485) (0.0090) (0.0380) (0.0007)
No. of 
observations
973 973 973 973 973 973 973
Log likehood -281.7351 -282.0447 -282.0794 -282.0423 -282.1776 -323.2812 -279.4649
***, **, * denote that the coefficient is significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. t statistics based on robust 
standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 12
The determinant’s of bank’s organizational form to enter the CE countries
The dependent variable is equal one if an particular entry from country ^ into country ] occurs at time i. In the regression (1) 
the dependent variable equal one if the organizational form is a branch, in the regression (2) if it is a subsidiary and in the 
regression (3) if the entry is an effect of acquisition.
(1) (2) (3)
Bank freedom index -3.6800** -0.2572 -0.5330**
1.4437 0.3892 0.2147
Creditor rights -6.0274*** -3.0948*** -0.8189***
0.8260 0.7198 0.2336
Liquid liabilities -0.6791** 0.3266*** -0.0304
0.2918 0.1182 0.0611
Bank deposits -2.9354*** -0.4692*** 0.1062*
1.0028 0.1278 0.0610
Net interest margin -9.0712*** -0.4191* -0.0234
3.4256 0.2339 0.1205
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(1) (2) (3)
Distance -0.4266** -0.0083 -0.1292
0.2006 0.1410 0.1337
Concentration ratio 3.1794*** 0.0856 -0.1017***
1.2115 0.0810 0.0305
Market Cap. 0.1304** -0.0171 -0.0224
0.0659 0.0145 0.0099
Country risk 0.4802*** 0.0711 -0.0714***
0.1424 0.0712 0.0279
Tax rate 0.3908*** -0.0469*** -0.0233*
0.1505 0.0168 0.0136
Trade -0.0045 0.0141*** 0.0109
0.0062 0.0024 0.0021
Diff. in growth rates -0.0499 -0.0595** -0.0093
0.0344 0.0258 0.0307
Income per capita 0.0050*** 0.0001 -0.0003***
0.0018 0.0001 0.0001
Wald test 0.3179 0.2702 0.1752
***, **, * denote that the coefficient is significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. t statistics based on robust 
standard errors in parenthesis.
The results in table 12 show that none of the entry modes stays in direct competition. 
It might suggest that the foreign banks had different motives to establish their presence in 
the CE markets. Hence, the organizational forms chosen by the foreign institutions could 
be considered as complementary rather than as substitutes as suggesting the analysis from 
the developed countries (Heinkel and Levi, 1992). Moreover, the results may partly explain 
why the banking sectors in the CE countries are overbanked but underserviced (Heinz 
2004, OENB 2002, Bonin et al. 1998). It may suggest that the level of the banking services 
were the same among the organizational forms of foreign banks.
In the regression (1) in table 12, the coefficients of country characteristics variables are 
in most cases significantly different from zero. Reversely than our previous results, the tax 
rate appears in the regression highly economic significant suggesting that it has an impact 
on bank’s organizational form. The signs of the coefficients show, however, different signs. 
The positive sign of the coefficient for branch regression indicates that since branches have 
an advantage in shifting profits across borders, they were more likely in countries with the 
higher tax rates. This finding is in line with the results presented in the literature (Cerulti et 
al. 2005). The other organizational forms since they fall under the local tax regime, they were 
more likely in countries with lower corporate tax rates. The variable proxy the risk of a country 
suggests interesting implications. It appears significant only in two regressions, although of 
opposite signs. As we have expected and in line with previous findings, branches were less 
likely in countries with high country risk as they are considered to be the most sensitive 
to the local country conditions. Hence, the coefficient in a regression where a branch 
is our dependent variable has a positive sign. In case of regression when a subsidiary is 
a dependent variable, the country risk seems not to be economic important, although it also 
shows a positive sign. The sign of the coefficient of the acquisition regression is significantly 
different from zero but opposite to the regressions with subsidiaries and branches it has 
a negative sign. An explanation for that might be that many acquisitions’ deals occurred 
following the economic crises in the host countries since these events provided great 
opportunities for favourable transaction in terms of acquiring local banks.
The size of the banking sector and financial structure suggest very interesting 
implications. Financial development matters mostly in foreign bank entries via branches 
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and subsidiaries. In case of regression where a acquisition deal is our dependent variable 
only the coefficient of bank deposits is positive and significantly different from zero. 
The result may confirm that as most acquisitions transactions were driven by potential 
opportunities in the retail and wholesale banking, the inheritance of the important clients 
were of great importance. On the other hand, the result might suggest that foreign banks 
acquiring or merging with the domestic banks were more oriented towards servicing 
large institutional and corporate clients, whom they inherited with the portfolios of the 
domestic banks. The results for a branch regression are of totally different nature. The 
negative signs of both coefficients may be explained by the fact that at the beginning 
the branches of foreign banks entered in the early stage of countries’ development being 
driven by the privatization processes of enterprises, which partly took place via stock 
exchanges. Most branches of the foreign institutions were involved in a big portion of 
these transactions rendering investment banking services. With the development of the 
stock markets as well as growth of the private sector, the branches of the foreign banks 
extended the scope of their activities offering variety of products related to the money and 
capital markets. Thus, controlling also for the stock market capitalization, the coefficient 
of this variable is highly significant and exerts a positive sign. This result supports Heinkel 
and Levi’s (1992) hypothesis that setting up a branch of a foreign bank should be justified 
by sufficient activities in the area for which a branch offers an advantage. The regression 
for subsidiaries shows however different results. The signs are exactly reverse than the 
signs of the coefficients of the acquisitions’ regression and are significantly different from 
zero. The positive sign of the liquid liabilities suggests that with the development of the 
financial sectors the new opportunities for subsidiaries of the foreign banks emerged. The 
stock market capitalization appears in the regression as insignificant. Thus, it seems that 
the stock market activity did not determine the set up of subsidiaries by foreign banks in 
a local banking market. The negative sign of the coefficient for the acquisition regression 
may again confirm the entering foreign banks in the period following the financial crises, 
where the activity of the stock markets tends to decline.
The variable measuring the concentration level of the banking sector shows in two 
cases positive signs and in case of the acquisition regression a negative sign. Besides the 
subsidiary regression where the variable is statistically insignificant, the other coefficients 
are highly economic significant. The positive sign of the coefficient for the branch 
regression might be explained by a different scope of activities, mostly in investment and 
corporate banking, rendered by this form of the foreign institutions. They have not stayed 
in the direct competition to the ones serviced by the local banks. Higher concentration of 
the banking sector meant the dominance of several local institutions in the credit market. 
6XFKDVWUXFWXUHRIWKHEDQNLQJPDUNHWVJDYHRWKHUIRUHLJQLQVWLWXWLRQVWKHSRVVLELOLW\WR
gain their shares in other fields. It might be especially true for the developing economies, 
where the markets are unsaturated and the development of the financial sectors forces 
other financial products and services to be strongly desired. Another picture presents the 
regression in which a acquisition deal is considered to be our dependent variable. The 
coefficient of the concentration level with a negative sign may suggest that in the markets 
where the local banks enhance their market power, the states banks were less willing to sell 
their stakes for foreign institutions.
Many foreign institutions entered the CE banking markets in order to provide their 
home clients with the services on site. In the beginning the banks restricted their activities 
to trade services. The positive and significant variable for the subsidiary regression may 
indicate that mostly subsidiaries were the modes of entry chosen by foreign banks to 
service their clients. The insignificance of the coefficient of the acquisition regression may 
VXJJHVWRQGLIIHUHQWW\SHVRIFOLHQWVIROORZHG6LQFHVXEVLGLDULHVPLJKWIROORZPXOWLQDWLRQDO
companies, entries of foreign banks through acquisition of the local banks could and 
hence might indicate that they might service larger companies. The coefficient of the trade 
variable for the branch regression shows as expected a negative sign and it is insignificant.Results
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Interesting implications suggest the variable measuring the distance between the 
parent bank and its presence in the home country. Although, the coefficients from all 
three regressions show a negative sign, as expected, only for branch specification, it is 
significant. The result is not surprising as most of the entries through acquisitions and 
subsidiaries occurred among European banks, all CE countries can be considered to be of 
comparable distance.
The first conclusion that we can draw with regard to the banking regulations for 
all three regressions is that higher banking regulations hinder the foreign banks’ entries. 
However, only in the regression (1) for branches and (3) for acquisitions, the coefficients 
of the variable are highly significant from zero. The reason is that the branches and 
acquisitions were the organizational forms which were regulated differently among the CE 
countries. The results of the influence of the creditor rights confirm our findings from the 
first regression.
The coefficients of the net interest margin present the same signs for all the regression 
specifications, yet it differ in their statistical significance. The negative sign of the net 
interest income may indicate increasing competition. Increasing competition may explain 
why we observe the statistical significance of the coefficient for a acquisition regression. 
Thus, this method of entry may be preferred foreign banks with the aim to reach a strong 
position in the local markets in a short period.
The literature on the international banking refers very often to the income per capita 
as a variable measuring a host countries’ purchasing power and thus demand for the 
ILQDQFLDOVHUYLFHV%XFKDQG/DSS%XFK6DJDUL<DPRULDQGODUJHO\
find a positive relation to foreign banking assets or FDIs. Our result however indicates that 
the impact of this variable depends on type of the organizational form chosen by a foreign 
institution. We find that the branches were more likely in the wealthier countries once 
acquisition in the poorer. For the subsidiary regression, the income per capita seems not to 
have an explanatory power.
The difference in the growth rates between home and host countries indicates that 
the lower the difference (the higher the growth rate of the host country), the higher the 
probability of an entry into a host country. The result is valid for all regressions, although 
the coefficients for the branch and acquisition regressions are not statistically significant.
Table 13 analyses the differences in a greater detail by an econometric comparison of 
the presence of branches in respect to subsidiaries and acquisitions, while table 14 shows 
the comparison of subsidiaries in respect to acquisitions.
As we can see from the table 13, the examination of the branches with respect 
to subsidiaries and acquisitions supports that the branches do not stay in any direct 
competition to other banks’ organizational forms in the CE countries. The results fully 
reflect the findings from the simple probit regression presented in the table 12. The one 
difference is the insignificance of the bank freedom coefficient in the branch regression 
versus acquisitions one. The reason might be due to two offsetting effects: (a) the 
branches were more likely in countries with lower regulations on branches, (b) in countries 
where the higher regulations on branches applied, the foreign banks chose an entry via 
acquisition instead.
The regressions in table 14 confronting the subsidiaries versus acquisitions 
indicate, on the other hand, more interesting implications. Already the result of Wald test 
suggests on some correlation between acquisitions and subsidiaries. This comes from the 
significance of the coefficient of trade in case we confront the entries through acquisitions 
with subsidiaries.Results
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Table 13
The determinant’s of a bank’s organizational form to enter the CE countries













Bank free index -3.5805*** -0.2600 -6.1753 -0.5328**
(1.2670) (0.3906) (6.2767) (0.2146)
Creditor rights -5.9824*** -3.0971*** -8.5927*** -0.8269***
(0.9302) (0.7156) (2.4903) (0.2358)
Liquid liabilities  -0.6776 0.3299*** -0.8109*** -0.0350
(0.2988) (0.1180) (0.1605) (0.0598)
Bank deposits  -2.9569*** -0.4737*** -3.7757*** 0.1109*
(1.0746) (0.1276) (0.9332) (0.0597)
Net interest margin -9.1258** -0.4230* -11.2538*** -0.0238
(3.6072) (0.2319) (1.6624) (0.1202)
Distance -0.4231** -0.0082 -0.4877*** -0.1293
(0.1967) (0.1404) (0.1883) (0.1343)
Concentration ratio 3.2009** 0.0855 3.9711*** -0.0999***
(1.2751) (0.0810) (0.7180) (0.0303)
Market capitalization 0.1316 -0.0173 0.1637*** -0.0221**
(0.0696) (0.0143) (0.0415) (0.0099)
Country risk 0.4825*** 0.0704 0.6393*** -0.0699**
(0.1506) (0.0715) (0.1315) (0.0276)
Tax rate 0.3943** -0.0468*** 0.4736*** -0.0231*
(0.1590) (0.0168) (0.0892) (0.0136)
Trade -0.0036 0.0141*** -0.0114 0.0109
(0.0058) (0.0024) (0.0071) (0.0021)
Non-financial FDIs
Diff. growth rates -0.0493 -0.0597** -0.0247 -0.0090
(0.0339) (0.0257) (0.0397) (0.0306)
Income per capita 0.0050*** 0.0001 0.0062*** -0.0003***
(0.0019) (0.0001) (0.0010) (0.0001)
Wald test 0.3651 0.3651 0.0992 0.0992
***, **, * denote that the coefficient is significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. t statistics based on robust 
standard errors in parenthesis
Once we consider them separately, the coefficient of this variable in the acquisition 
regression seems to appear as economically unimportant. This could suggest that 
subsidiaries of foreign banks could compete with the acquired local banks for some clients, 
possibly larger multinational companies. After the inclusion of the non-financial FDIs, we 
see that this variable is significant only in the acquisition regression suggesting that since 
the acquirers were large international banks, they could also follow large clients engaged 
in various investments in the CE markets. We can also see that inclusion of the FDIs modify 
slightly our results in regression (3) supporting the results of Miller and Parkhe (1998) that 
different forms of entry are positively correlated with following specific clients. Moreover, 
the result suggests that since the acquisitions and subsidiaries of foreign banks competed 
to the some extent, they reacted similarly to some effects.Results
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Table 14
The determinant’s of a bank’s organizational form to enter the CE countries
The dependent variable is equal one if a particular entry from country ^ into country ] occurs at year i. In the regression (3) 














Bank free index -0.3376 -0.5491*** 0.4846 -0.8223** 0.8016 -0.4249
(0.3669) (0.2131) (0.7726) (0.3402) (1.5960) (0.4262)
Creditor rights -2.9704*** -0.8210*** -6.0261* -0.9175*** -17.8308** -0.9668***
(0.7292) (0.2340) (3.4881) (0.2731) (8.2145) (0.3050)
Liquid liabilities  0.3050** -0.0323 1.2992 -0.3524*** 2.0305 -0.3012***
(0.1197) (0.0611) (1.4516) (0.1334) (2.0066) (0.0973)
Bank deposits  -0.4326*** 0.1100 -1.3996 0.4141*** -2.1860 0.3480***
(0.1278) (0.0618) (1.4499) (0.1370) (1.8188) (0.1217)
Net interest 
margin
-0.3742* -0.0224 -0.1041 -0.0456 -0.2176 -0.0802
(0.2225) (0.1212) (0.2447) (0.1062) (0.4224) (0.0997)
Distance -0.0024 -0.1309 -0.0086 -0.1725 -0.0015 -0.1707
(0.1427) (0.1346) (0.1725) (0.1396) (0.1708) (0.1386)
Concentration 
ratio
0.0746 -0.1042*** 0.1290 -0.0894** 0.0405 -0.0970*
(0.0789) (0.0307) (0.0848) (0.0421) (0.0613) (0.0518)
Market Cap. -0.0182 -0.0223** 0.0192 -0.0016 -0.1113 -0.0165
(0.0137) (0.0097) (0.0568) (0.0188) (0.0880) (0.0452)
Country risk 0.0571 -0.0718*** 0.0246 -0.0591** -0.0443 -0.0537
(0.0644) (0.0276) (0.0822) (0.0301) (0.0487) (0.0318)
Tax rate -0.0443** -0.0237* -0.1488 0.0098 -0.4040 -0.0551
(0.0185) (0.0137) (0.1837) (0.0210) (0.3345) (0.0336)
Trade 0.0137*** 0.0110*** 0.0131*** 0.0084*** 0.0156*** 0.0087***
(0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0029) (0.0022)
Non-financial FDIs -0.0428 0.0981** -0.1090 0.0774*
(0.0895) (0.0423) (0.2275) (0.0447)
Diff in growth 
rates
-0.0611** -0.0090 -0.1111*** -0.0327 -0.1030*** -0.0311
(0.0260) (0.0311) (0.0348) (0.0336) (0.0389) (0.0346)
Income per capita
0.0001 -0.0003*** -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0004*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0011) (0.0002)
Wald test 0.0066 0.0066 0.0184 0.0184 0.0293 0.0293
***, **, * denote that the coefficient is significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. t statistics based on robust 
standard errors in parenthesis
The results in table 14 regression (3) seem to reflect the results from regression 
(2), however the bank freedom index and country risk variables became insignificant 
for both acquisition and subsidiaries regressions. This may support our previous finding 
that controlling for the omitted country characteristics and location specific factors, the 
differences between the CE countries in terms of banking regulations and country risk do 
not explain different modes of entries chosen by foreign banks.Conclusion




In the last decade we have witnessed a large influx of foreign banks into the CE markets. 
As a result the share of foreign bank assets rose from below 20 per cent to almost 80 per 
cent in all the CE transition economies. We assume that the foreign banking in the CE will 
continue to expand, albeit at a slower pace.
The literature on international banking has identified several factors that influence 
the location choice of foreign banks. With this paper we add to this literature twofold. 
First, we have examined the determinants of banks’ choice – whether and where to engage 
LQDIRUHLJQPDUNHW6HFRQGZHKDYHVWXGLHGWKHGHWHUPLQDQWVRIRUJDQL]DWLRQDOIRUP
chosen by foreign banks when engaging in a CE market. Our empirical results show that 
macroeconomic and institutional determinants influenced significantly a foreign bank’s 
decision to expand into the CE countries. We find that the foreign institutions were 
mostly attracted by large potential of the CE banking markets and low degree of their 
financial sophistication. This finding stays on the contrary to the results from the developed 
countries, where the foreign banks are more likely to expand the countries with a high 
level of financial and banking system development. According to these studies, only such 
markets offer more efficient banking product opportunities. Our results do not support 
this view. They rather suggest that less developed financial systems offer a wider range 
of possibilities for foreign banks to achieve great profits. Moreover, we show that in the 
beginning of the transition process, many foreign banks decided to engage in the CE 
markets simply by following their clients. In the course of financial development occurring 
LQWKH&(FRXQWULHVWKHQHZRSSRUWXQLWLHVHPHUJHGDQGEDQNĳVĴIROORZWKHFXVWRPHUĵ
behavior has been replaced by a search for client’s behavior. We also find that most foreign 
banks entries occurred in the poor creditor rights protection. However, the legal origin of 
the home country was of great economic importance. We show that common law countries 
as well as countries with German and French law traditions were the most likely to enter the 
CE banking markets than other legal families. Finally, in line with other studies, our results 
suggest that most banks stem from neighbor European countries. This is confirmed by 
a negative and significant coefficient of the distance between a host country and a foreign 
bank’s headquarter.
We also looked on the modes of foreign bank entry and its relationship to the 
economic determinants. We find that the choice of organizational form of a foreign bank 
depend strongly on the economic characteristics of the host country. Moreover, consistent 
with previous studies, we show that the decision on mode of entry is determined by 
a scope of activities a foreign bank is going to render in a host country as well as by a type 
of client followed.
Our results are important from a research point of view. They expand the previous 
literature on different economic factors encouraging foreign bank entries. They introduce 
a wider set of explanatory variables than previous studies on this topic. They also shed 
a light how different factors influence various organizational forms of entries, thus fitting in 
the growing literature on the role of foreign banks in the host countries’ financial systems.
The results are also important from the policy perspectives. For one, they show 
that high level of financial sophistication and strong creditors’ rights protection are not 
DQHFHVVDU\SUHUHTXLVLWHWRDWWUDFWIRUHLJQEDQNV6LQFHWKHIRUHLJQEDQNVKDYHEHHQVKRZQ
to have a beneficial influence on domestic financial systems, it seems to be good news, Conclusion
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especially for developing and other transition countries whose financial systems are poorly 
developed and the access to the financial services is constrained. Furthermore, since the 
behavior of foreign banks changes with the development of financial systems, this suggests 
different implications for the supervisory authorities. Replacing the foreign banks’ behavior 
E\ĴVHDUFKLQJIRUFOLHQWVĳEHKDYLRUĵPLJKWHQFRXUDJHIRUHLJQEDQNVWRWDNHRQH[FHVVLYH
risks which might cause important consequences for the stability of the host countries’ 
financial systems and thus might require specific policy responses.
Finally, our results suggest further agenda for research. One area for further research 
would be to investigate the impact of mode of entry and organizational form on foreign 
bank behavior in the developing countries in more detail. Can the fact that the various 
organizational forms react differently on the location-specific factors be explained by 
different behavior of these banks in the host countries? If yes, in what activities they engage 
in. Would it be true that foreign banks entering through cross-border acquisitions are more 
oriented towards large retail and wholesale clients neglecting lending to small businesses? 
The findings from the developed countries suggest so. Additionally, the results from the 
developed countries suggest that subsidiaries of foreign banks are more likely to engage in 
the retail and small-business lending and hence promoting greater access to the financial 
services. The picture of the CE countries, however, shows that many subsidiaries of foreign 
banks operate in the niche business providing such services as car loans or mortgages. 
Thus, the scope of the activities of the foreign subsidiaries in the developing countries 
requires a deeper investigation. And finally, does a lack of branches have any consequences 
RQWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHILQDQFLDOV\VWHPVLQWKH&(FRXQWULHV"6HYHUDOVWXGLHVLQGLFDWH
that banking sectors of the transition countries are overbanked but underserviced. It would 
be interesting to find out the reasons for this.
 Related to this, it would be interesting to look at banks’ determinants in the decision 
process of whether to enter through de novo operation or cross-border acquisitions. 
6LQFHWKHEHKDYLRURIIRUHLJQEDQNVPD\YDU\LQWKHILQDQFLDOGLVWUHVVWKHUHJXODWRUV
should monitor what banks are likely to choose subsidiaries rather than branches as an 
entry mode into a host country. None of these areas has yet much been studied for 
developing countries.References
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Appendix
Variable name Description and Source
Country-characteristics
Tax rate
Corporate tax rate. Data available for all countries from 1994 to 2004.
Source: Eurostat, Borish and Noel (1996)
Exchange rate
Exchange rate of the national currency of a host country to EUR. For the years when the euro 
currency was not implemented, we used the relation to ECU. Data available for all countries for 
the period: 1994-2004.
Source: National banks 
Growth rates 
Difference in growth rates between a home and a host country. Data available for all countries 
for the period: 1994-2004.
Source: World Bank Development Indicators
Income per capita
Gross domestic product per capita expressed in current prices. Data available for all countries 
from 1994 to 2004.
Source: OECD
Inflation
Logarithm of the geometric average annual growth rate of the consumer price inflation for the 
time period 1994 to 2004.
Source: Economic Intelligence Unit
Country Risk
Composite Risk Rating defines the overall risk of a country. It comprises 22 variables in three 
subcategories of risk: political, financial and economic. A separate index is created for each of 
the subcategories. The Political Risk index is based on 100 points and includes such components 
as: government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external 
conflict, corruption, military in politics, religious tensions, law and order, ethnic tensions, 
democratic accountability, bureaucracy quality; the Financial Risk is based on 50 points and 
capture such components as: GDP per head, real GDP growth, annual inflation rate, budget 
balance as percentage of GDP, current account as percentage of GDP. The Financial Risk Rating 
is based on 50 points and includes: foreign debs as percentage of GDP, foreign debt service 
as percentage of exports of goods and services, current account as percentage of exports of 
goods and services, net international liquidity as months of import cover, exchange rate stability. 
The Composite Risk Rating comprises 50% of political risk rating, 25% of financial and 25% of 
economic risk ratings. The risk of a country ranges from 00.0-49.5 points-very high risk to 80.00-
100.00-very low risk.
Source: International Country Risk Guide
Financial development
Liquid Liabilities
Liquid liabilities of the financial system (currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of 
the banks and non-banks financial intermediaries) divided by GDP. The variable is constructed 
following the methodology of Beck, Levine and Demirgüç-Kunt (2000) based on data from the 
International Financial Statistics. Liquid liabilities are calculated using line 551(liquid liabilities) or 
line 351 (money or quasi money) if liquid liabilities are not available. Data for GDP uses line 99b 
and for annual CPI 64. Data available for all countries from 1994 to 2004.
Source: International Financial Statistics and Beck et al. (2000) 
Bank deposits
Demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money banks as a share of GDP. The variable is 
constructed following the methodology of Beck and Levine and Demirgüç-Kunt based on data from 
the International Financial Statistics. Bank deposits are calculated using lines 24 and 25, GDP uses 
99b line and for annual CPI 64. Data available for all countries for the period: 1994-2004.
Source: International Financial Statistics and Beck et al. (2000)l
Stock market turnover 
ratio
Ratio of value of total shares traded to average real market capitalization. The variable is 
constructed following the methodology of Beck and Levine and Demirgüç-Kunt (2000). The total 
value traded and market capitalization use Standard and Poor’s Emerging Market Database, 
annual CPI uses line 64 from International Financial Statistics. Data available for Poland and 
Hungary from 1994 to 2004 and for the Czech Republic and Slovakia from 1995 to 2004.
Source: International Financial Statistics, Standard and Poor’s Emerging Market Database
Market capitalization
Total shares traded on the stock market exchange to GDP. Data available for all countries from 
1994-2004.
Source: Standard and Poor’s Emerging Market Database, World BankAppendix 




An index measures the relative openness of a country’s banking and financial system. It 
determines whether foreign banks and financial services firms are able to operate freely, how 
difficult it is to open domestic banks and other financial services firms, how heavily regulated the 
financial system is, how great the presence of state-owned banks is, whether the government 
influences the allocation of credits and whether banks are free to provide customers with 
insurance and invest in securities (and vice versa). It ranges from 1 (very low restrictions) to 5 
(very high restrictions).
Source: Barth et al. (2000)
Creditor rights index
An index aggregating different creditor rights. The index is formed by adding 1 when: (1) no 
moratorium on payments once the reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic 
stay on secured assets); (2) secured assets first (first or after costs of bankruptcy procedure 
are met; 0,75=second after costs and other creditor category; 0,5=third after costs and other 
two creditor categories; 0,25=fourth after costs and other creditor categories; 0=priority not 
different from unsecured creditors); (3) the debtor does not retain freely the administration of its 
property pending the resolution of the reorganization (management does not stay (receiver)); (4) 
automatic trigger to file bankruptcy (i.e. if debtor unable to meet obligations for more than 90 
days); (5) the adoption of a reorganization or liquidation plan requires creditor consent. The index 
ranges from 0 to 5.
Source: La Porta (1998), Pistor et al. (2000)
Net interest margin
The accounting value of net interest income to bank’s earning assets Data from 1994 to 2004.
Source: Beck, Demirgüç–Kunt and Levine (2001), World Bank Database (2004)
Concentration ratio
Ratio calculated as assets of five largest banks as a share of assets of all commercial banks. Data 
available for all countries from 1994 to 2004.
Source: National banks, Eurostat
Overheads
Difference in accounting value of a bank’s overheads to its total assets.
Source: Bankscope
“Follow the customer hypothesis”
Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI)
Poland: FDI is referred to as the inward of stocks and flows, including equity capital, reinvested 
earnings and other capital, whereby the investment in the financial sector are excluded, that 
means in monetary institutions, other financial institutions (of which also the financial holding 
institutions) and insurance companies or other financial institutions rendering insurance services. 
The data follow the OECD’s benchmark definition of foreign direct investment, including the ten 
percent rule of ownership interests and voting power rights. In 1996, account losses have been 
deducted from the reinvested earnings. Data cover the period from 1994-2004.
Hungary: FDI is defined as investment in equity capital over ten percent, reinvested earnings 
and other capital flows, whereby the investment in financial sector are excluded, that means in 
monetary institutions, other financial institutions (of which also the financial holding institutions), 
insurance companies or other financial institutions rendering insurance services. The reinvested 
earnings are defined as after-tax profit minus dividends declared payable in the same period. 
Data cover the period from 1999-2004.
Czech Republic: FDI is referred to as the inward of stocks and flows, including equity capital, 
reinvested earnings and other capital in the non-financial sector. Non-financial sector excludes 
the investment in monetary institutions, other financial institutions (of which also the financial 
holding institutions), insurance companies or other financial institutions rendering insurance 
services. The data follow the OECD’s benchmark definition of foreign direct investment, including 
the ten percent rule of ownership interests and voting power rights. The reinvested earnings are 
calculated as profits/losses minus distributed dividends. Data available for the period 1994–2004.
Slovakia: FDI is referred to as the inward of stocks and flows, including equity capital, reinvested 
earnings and other capital in the non-financial sector. Non-financial sector excludes the 
investment in monetary institutions, other financial institutions (of which also the financial holding 
institutions), insurance companies or other financial institutions rendering insurance services. 
The data follow the OECD’s benchmark definition of foreign direct investment, including the 
ten percent rule of ownership interests and voting power rights. The reinvested earnings are 
calculated as profits/losses minus distributed dividends. Data available for the period 1994-2004.
Source: OECD report on Foreign Direct Investment, supplemented by national banks’ reports 
Trade
Volume of export and import from a home country into a host country expressed as ratio to the 
host country’s GDP. Data available for Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic for the period of 




Identifies the legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial Code of each country. There 
are five possible origins: (1) English Common Law, (2) French Commercial Code, (3) German 
Commercial Code, (4) Scandinavian Commercial Code, (5) Socialist/Communist Laws.
Source: La Porta et al. (1999)
Distance
Logarithm of the distance between headquarter and a capital city of a host country.
Source: CIA The World Fact book
EU-dummy Equals 1 if a country is an official member of European Union and 0 otherwise. 